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3. Abstract 
The classical model of the liberal-democratic nation-state is on the decline 
in the West as a result of globalization, regionalization, multiculturalism, the 
institutionalization of universal minority rights and the rise of minority 
ethnonationalism. While western countries are decoupling the nation-state 
and slowly shifting toward multicultural democracy, some other countries are 
consolidating an alternative form of a democratic state that is identified with 
and subservient to a single ethnic nation. This type of political regime, “ethnic 
democracy,” combines the extension of civil and political rights for all 
permanent residents with an institutionalized ethnic ascendancy of the 
majority group. The core ethnic nation controls the state and uses it to further 
its national interests and to grant its members a favored status. The non-core 
groups are accorded individual and collective rights and allowed to conduct a 
struggle for change, but treated as second-class citizens and placed under 
control. 
In this paper the model of ethnic democracy is presented in a full and in a 
mini version. The model consists of three parts: features of the regime, the 
circumstances leading to it and the conditions contributing to its stability. The 
criticisms against the general model, relating to its alleged illegitimacy, 
instability and inefficiency, are discussed and answered. Ethnic democracy is 
also distinguished from civic democracies (individual liberal democracy, 
republican liberal democracy, multicultural democracy, consociational 
democracy) on the one hand, and from quasi- or non-democracies (control, 
Herrenvolk democracy, ethnocracy), on the other. 
The mini-model of ethnic democracy is applied in detail to Israel, which 
serves as an archetype and a springboard for its initial formulation. It is 
applied in a condensed form to Slovakia and Estonia, and is illustrated very 
briefly by Northern Ireland (1921-72), Poland (1918-35) and Malaysia. 
It is posited that the model of ethnic democracy is particularly valid for 
democratizing states that attempt to manage their divided societies without 
giving up structured majority dominance. Some countries in Central Eastern 
Europe are strongly disposed to this strategy. More applications of the model 
are needed in order to develop it further. 
 
4. Introduction 
The classical democratic, homogeneous nation-state in the West has been under 
attack since World War Two. Some of the forces impinge on the nation-state “from 
above.” They include regionalization and globalization which both decrease the 
strength of the state and create overarching transnational entities and identities. The 
European Union is the leading regional power in the world. The building of a 
European market, a parliament, a mutually compatible social security system, and a 
common identity blurs the boundaries between nation-states and strengthens 
transnational and regional considerations. The globalization of the economy, of mass 
communication, tourism and culture also enfeebles the bounded nation-state and 
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encourages transnational thinking and interests. We are also witnessing a phenomenal 
growth of what Kymlicka (2001) calls “universal minority rights,” namely, 
international standards for the treatment of ethno-cultural groups (immigrants, 
national minorities, indigenous peoples), grounded in international law, international 
conventions and inter-state treaties. This is not just a universal moral code but also a 
set of rules for international intervention in case of gross violations of minority rights. 
It is certainly bound to erode the sovereignty of the state and its authority to act 
single-handedly. 
Other developments undermine the nation-state “from the bottom.” The 
combination of ongoing democratization and continued cultural and economic 
deprivation of indigenous minorities reinforces their nationalism and claims for 
cultural retention and political representation. Spain is a prime example. The flow of 
non-assimilating immigrants and the rise of minority nationalism seriously challenge 
the homogeneity of the nation-state and its intolerance of ethnic and cultural diversity. 
This trend of change in the West gradually decouples nation and state, fosters 
tolerance of ethnic heterogeneity, and scatters multiculturalism as an ideology. 
In a world of states internally divided by ethnicity, nationality, religion, language, 
or race (A. Smith 1995) and in an era of growing democratization (Huntington, 1991), 
it is doubtful, therefore, if the liberal-democratic nation-state is still the most fruitful 
model for describing and analyzing the complex realities of political systems existing, 
changing, or emerging in the West and in divided societies all over the world. 
Alongside this liberal type of democracy, the West has another, though infrequent, 
type, known in the literature as “consociational democracy.” It is exemplified by 
Belgium and based on the idea of bilingualism, biculturalism and binationalism. It is, 
nevertheless, unrealistic to expect liberal and consociational democracies, the two 
main models recognized in the West today and identified in the current literature of 
comparative politics, to properly represent the increasing diversity of democratic 
political systems worldwide. 
Since the late sixties the old Western liberal democracies have been positively 
responding to strong pressures to accommodate minority demands for equal rights and 
opportunity and for the recognition of separate cultures and identities. The politics of 
difference and multiculturalism has forced these liberal democracies, which formally 
ignore ethnic differences, to open up and to support some sort of collective rights. 
These democracies are thus transforming themselves into a new system that can be 
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called “multicultural democracy,” positioned somewhere between liberal and 
consociational democracy. 
While western countries are moving away from the homogenous nation-state 
toward multiculturalism, some other countries are building a nation-state. In many 
countries that lack a democratic tradition, the state is dominated by a single ethnic 
group and it takes the form of an “ethnic state,” i.e. the state is used as a means to 
institutionalize dominance and privilege of one ethnic group. The question is what 
forms of democracy these ethnically divided societies or non-democratic ethnic states 
take in response to challenges by non-dominant ethnic groups or when they embark 
on a transition to democracy. 
The collapse of Communism, the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet 
tutelage, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia, have stirred many suppressed ethnic and national conflicts and 
unleashed attempts to establish democracies in divided societies. Yet democratization 
is a global wave engulfing countries in eastern and southern Europe, Latin America 
and other areas. What are the types of democracy available to these democratizing 
states in ethnically divided societies for consideration and emulation? 
Ethnic and national cleavages constitute a major impediment to democratization. 
According to Brubaker (1996), three types of nationalism interact to destabilize the 
new or restructured states in inter-war and post-1990 Europe. Looming largest is the 
“nationalism of the nationalizing state,” aiming to cast the state as an ethnically 
homogenous nation-state, a state of and for a particular nation, “to make the state 
what it is properly and legitimately destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, 
demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally 
state-bearing nation” (p. 63). The “nationalism of the national minority” seeks to 
forestall these nationalizing policies and practices, to do away with discrimination and 
exclusion, to pursue autonomy, and sometimes even to push for secession. The third 
kind is the “nationalism of the external homeland” that sees itself responsible for the 
welfare and fate of the non-citizen co-ethnic minority in another state and intervenes 
on its behalf. This triadic, conflict-ridden configuration of nationalisms is different 
from the problems of national integration in older European and post-colonial states in 
Africa and Asia. 
By the same token, Linz and Stepan (1996) see nationalism, or more precisely, the 
state policy to create a nation-state in a divided society, as a hindrance to the 
  8 
consolidation of democracy. Many contemporary European liberal democracies 
implemented a policy of cultural and ethnic homogenization. They did so over a 
period of over several centuries and applied coercion when necessary. More recently, 
however, these western states are reversing the historical trend and moving in the 
direction toward multicultural democracy. 
A homogenizing policy would encounter strong resistance in democratizing states 
today. This is because it is executed rather swiftly, coercion is today easier to resist, 
the ethnic elite has ample resources to mobilize the minority, the minority may have 
an external homeland that can intervene, minorities are growing in size and getting 
more dispersed, and the present international community is more tolerant of cultural 
diversity. Some of the democratizing states also suffer from a sharp disagreement 
between majority and minority on fundamental issues such as the very separateness of 
a given state, the demarcation of its borders and the rules of citizenship and 
naturalization. It is suggested that the greater ethnic heterogeneity, majority-minority 
discord and awakening and resistance of minorities, the greater the need for state 
policies of full enfranchisement, recognition and acceptance of ethnic differences and 
extension of some group rights. 
Schopflin (2000) regards ethnonationalism as a real hindrance to democratization 
in post-communist states: “post-communist governments take the view that they do 
not represent citizens but the nation” (1996: 153). Ethnicity fills in the gap created by 
the destruction of civil societies by communism. In these states, there is a strong 
tendency for indigenous minorities to be non-assimilating, for majorities to be 
intolerant of cultural diversity and suspicious of claims for special rights based on 
ethnicity, and for various essentially non-ethnic issues to be ethnicized. 
The type of political system evolving in some of these democratizing states does 
not correspond to any of the known models. It can be called “ethnic democracy,” a 
regime that combines a structured ethnic dominance with democratic rights for all. 
The identification of this new kind of regime serves the need to expand and refine the 
types of democracy in order to better describe and understand the growing variegation 
of democratic and semi-democratic systems in a world of states internally divided by 
ethnicity. 
Linz and Stepan (1996: 428) make a step in this direction. They identify four 
democratizing strategies for handling ethnic cleavage. Their four-fold typology is 
based on two criteria: the nation-building ideology (demos [i.e., population] and 
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nation should be the same versus the possibility that they can be different) and the 
state-building strategy (exclusion versus inclusion of minority members as full 
citizens). While this scheme spells out two important dimensions, it does not provide 
a full-fledged multidimensional classification that can sensitize the user to more 
complex situations.1 
I suggest to enrich our typology of democracy with two new types – multicultural 
democracy and ethnic democracy. Both promise to be useful for both old and new 
democracies. This article briefly presents the various models of democracy but its 
main purpose is to introduce and to elaborate on the model of ethnic democracy. 
 
5. Defining Democracy 
The common approach in the social sciences is to define concepts as continuous 
variables, to divide the continuum into sections, to mark off points of transition 
between sections, and to identify a distinct type for each section. According to this 
approach, the term “democracy,” when it is restricted to a political regime only, can 
be defined as a continuous variable divided into a positive sector in which democratic 
regimes are located, a negative sector of non-democratic regimes, and a transition 
zone that separates them. The most widespread and accepted definition of democracy 
is minimal and procedural,2 according to which democracy is a regime that is 
characterized by free elections, universal suffrage, change of governments and respect 
of civil rights. This definition enables many countries to be included in the democratic 
camp, does not impose strict western criteria and recognizes numerous and novel 
versions of democracy. 
The minimal and procedural definition and the rising democratization of the world 
since the mid 1970s increase steadily the number of countries considered democratic. 
The American institute Freedom House conducts an annual survey of the current 
status of democracy in the world, based on the procedural definition and on two 
                                                 
1
 To illustrate the ambiguity of the four types in the Linz-Stepan typology, let us consider the 
Israeli case. Israel would fall in Type III (its elite subscribes to the ideology that demos and nation 
should be the same and the state institutes an inclusionary strategy because Israel extends full 
citizenship to the Arab minority). This type implies that the state would “make a major effort to 
assimilate minorities into national culture and give no special recognition to minority political or 
cultural rights.” As we will see below, Israel definitely does not pursue such a policy. At the same time, 
it will be wrong to classify Israel into Type IV since it is not a consociational democracy. 
2
 There is voluminous literature on this definition (see list in Collier and Levitsky 1997, note 13 on 
p. 434). For instance, Dahl (1971) discusses the minimal aspect of the definition and Huntington (1991: 
9) takes up the procedural aspect. 
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measuring scales with a range of 1-7 ranks: one scale refers to political rights (the 
right to vote, formation of political parties, free and fair elections), and the other scale 
refers to civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of 
religion). According to the 1984 survey, 36 per cent of the people lived in “free” 
countries (22 per cent in “partly free” countries, and 42 per cent in “not free” 
countries (Gastil 1985: 165), whereas according to the 1999 survey, the figures were 
39, 25 and 36 per cent respectively (Karatnycky 2000). This global survey included 
all the 192 countries that were independent in 1999: 85 countries were classified as 
“free” (in which lived 2.34 billion persons, 39 per cent of the world population), 59 as 
“partly free” (1.5 billion, 25 per cent) and 48 as “not free” (2.1 billion, 36 per cent).3 
The flow of democratization has created a wide spectrum of forms of democratic 
regimes and blurred the boundaries between democracy and non-democracy: “The 
recent global wave of democratization has presented scholars with the challenge of 
dealing with a great diversity of post-authoritarian regimes” (Collier and Levitsky 
1997: 430). 
Collier and Levitsky review in detail the various methods researchers use to deal 
with this new problem. The challenge to comparative study stems from the deviation 
of some of the regimes from the democracies practiced in progressive industrial 
societies. Many researchers cope with this challenge by adding adjectives to 
democracy. This strategy is designed to increase the analytical differentiation and to 
maintain conceptual validity but without conceptual stretching. It is done by 
digressing to some extent from the classical western types of democracy. One of the 
good methods is the use of “diminished adjectives.” This method neither broadens nor 
blurs the type of democracy but rather sharpens its original meaning by emphasizing a 
characteristic that is either lacking or deficient. For instance, the diminished type 
“restrictive democracy” is given to regimes that prevent certain political parties from 
participating in elections and violate the right of every party to vie for power. Another 
advantage of a diminished type of democracy is the avoidance of a simplistic 
dichotomy “democracy-nondemocracy” and the recognition of the mixed and hybrid 
nature of many of the new and renewed regimes. 
                                                 
3
 Huntington, who identified a third wave of democratization in the world, estimated that there 
were in 1990 130 countries with a population of at least one million, of which 59 (45.4 per cent) were 
democratic, in comparison with 30 democratic countries out of 122 (24.6 per cent) with a population of 
at least one million in 1973 (Huntington 1991: 26). 
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Another way to cope with the challenge of identifying and classifying political 
systems, with the transition to an era of multiplicity of democratic regimes, is to focus 
on the dimension of quality of democracy. Democratic regimes that meet the minimal 
and procedural definition differ considerably in the degree of their quality. As the 
number of democratic regimes rises, greater attention should be given to the 
assessment of their quality. Endorsing this position, Etzioni-Halevy explains why: 
“Democratic procedures are not enough. Such procedures produce democracy, but 
procedures alone cannot produce a high quality of democracy” (Etzioni-Halevy 1999: 
181). 
Quality of democracy may be reflected in general consensus on democratic 
procedures, equality of civil and political rights, legitimacy of all votes4, political 
tolerance, the exclusivity of parliamentary laws,5 reduction of class inequality, ease of 
mobility to political elites, political representation of all population groups and 
effective struggle of deprived groups. 
In addition to quality, democracies differ also in degree of their stability and 
efficiency. Stable democracy prevails in times of rapid change and deep crisis. 
Instability can stem from unsettled internal conflicts. Efficient democracy makes it 
possible to regulate conflicts between population groups peacefully. There is no 
necessary connection between quality, stability and efficiency of political regimes. 
Democratic regimes fall into two main categories: civic democracies whose 
cornerstone is the citizen or the citizenry irrespective of ethnic descent or religion; 
and ethnic democracies in which the ethnic nation is the centerpiece. Each category 
has subtypes. 
 
6. Types of Civic Democracy 
It is possible to identify four types of civic democracy that are relevant to the 
comparative study of divided societies. These are individual liberal democracy, 
republican liberal democracy, consociational democracy, and multicultural 
                                                 
4
 While votes of minorities are equally counted and influential, they may be considered 
illegitimate because ethnic majorities feel that in certain issues they should decide alone. 
5
 “Exclusivity” means that parliament is the only body that makes laws and does not delegate 
legislative powers on national level to other institutions. This principle is violated, for instance, in case 
of religion exclusively mandated by parliament to administer marriage and divorce. 
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democracy. They differ in the way they handle ethnicity and in the kind of rights 
extended to the ethnic groups. 
A. Individual Liberal Democracy 
In this type of democracy the state refers to citizens, provides them with rights, 
and demands from them to fulfill duties. Ethnic origin is privatized, not the basis for 
acquiring citizenship, and is not subject to legislation or state intervention. The state 
administers a policy of non-discrimination to insure equal opportunity. Members of 
ethnic groups are free to mix or to keep apart, to intermarry or to marry within the 
group, and to join the common state institutions or to construct their own at their own 
cost. Although the option of separation exists, the pressure to assimilate is very strong 
because the society at large is widely open and the individual, not the ethnic group, is 
the center of society. 
In this entirely individual-based democracy, the nation is subservient to the state. 
It is a civil, legal and territorial nation that every citizen belongs to automatically. The 
state is officially not identified with any ethnic nation, language and culture. It derives 
its legitimacy either from acquiescence in a formal constitution (“constitutional 
patriotism”) or from living on a shared territory, neither from a wide value consensus 
nor from a deep sense of belonging to a nation. The framework of individual liberal 
democracy is not the nation-state but rather the state as a common, shallow, 
instrumental and convenient bond for individual citizens. 
In individual liberal democracy the state itself is subservient to the individual, 
who is the centerpiece of society. The individual is conceived of as autonomous and 
free as long as he does not impinge on the rights of others or violate “universal” 
norms (e.g., commits infanticide). In addition, the state power to restrict individuals 
and to mold them into a certain type of person is minimized. 
Critics emphasize the inherent weakness of this conception of individual liberal 
democracy. The communitarians criticize its expressly atomizing conceptualization of 
society as a collection of individuals, its utter disregard of communities and its 
implicit discouragement of social solidarity. More importantly, individual liberal 
democracy is a purely normative model that hardly exists in reality. There is not even 
one case of democracy that fits the model well. Western democracies developed 
historically as nation-states that have been dominated by and identified with titular 
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nations. They have never been empty legal settings for unattached and indifferent 
individuals. 
 
B. Republican Liberal Democracy 
In contrast to the individual liberal democracy that seems to be an abstract and 
remote model rather than a familiar reality, republican liberal democracy is the most 
common and best-known type in the world. This is the political system that 
supposedly prevails in most Western states (Ackerman 1992). Similar to individual 
liberal democracy, equal individual rights are granted and collective rights are denied, 
but the framework for democracy is the civic nation-state that constitutes a “super 
community” for the citizens. In addition to being part of the republican state 
community, every citizen also belongs to a particular community (a cultural, 
linguistic, or ethnic group that provides a sense of belonging, identity, meaning and 
purpose). The state is identified with a certain language and culture that every citizen 
is required to adopt. Legal citizenship and acquisition of the state language and 
culture are sufficient for inclusion in the nation-state. The criteria for inclusion are 
non-ethnic, non-religious and non-ascriptive. 
The republican liberal democracy stratifies citizens according to their contribution 
to the common good. The civic nation that appropriates the state is a moral 
community with common national goals and a clear conception of the common good. 
Citizens are self-conscious individuals who are politically active in defining and 
promoting the common good (Oldfield 1990). Although formally equal, they are 
divided into “rank and file citizens” who enjoy just the common individual rights and 
the “good citizens” who get full privileges in exchange for their contribution to the 
civic virtue. 
The liberal nature of republican liberal democracy is anchored in its pervasive 
openness. It is liberal through inclusiveness: every citizen who acquires the titular 
language and culture is fully included in the nation-state and nobody is excluded on 
the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. It is also liberal in its voluntary 
character: the rule of inclusion and exclusion is willingly accepted and legitimized by 
individuals and groups in society. And lastly, republican liberal democracy is liberal 
in being an open-ended system, always subject to change: all citizens, as individuals 
or groups, can participate in determining, shaping and altering the societal goals and 
the definition of who is a good citizen. 
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Multiculturalists attack republican liberal democracy for its mishandling of non-
dominant ethno-cultural groups (Gutmann 1992; Parekh 2000). The titular group 
imposes its own language, culture and identity on the entire society and forces the 
other groups to abandon and compromise their distinct heritage. Consequently many 
groups are pressured to assimilate or are subjected to gross permanent discrimination.6 
Republican liberal democracies do not practice the liberal features they are noted for 
either. While they are formally and ethnically inclusive, they alienate and coerce non-
assimilating groups and disable them from revamping the system. To illustrate, in 
France, the archetype of republican liberal democracy, Corsicans are repeatedly 
denied any legal recognition of being nationally non-French and Moslem girls are 
denied wearing headscarves in public schools. 
The western republican liberal democracy evolved over several centuries through 
destruction of ethnic groups, involuntary assimilation, genocide of native populations 
and other means of forcible nation-building. After achieving relative cultural 
homogeneity and basic consensus, republican liberal democracy can function rather 
smoothly. It usually does justice to individuals and ethnic groups which are more 
concerned with equal opportunity than with the preservation of their separate 
collective existence and identity. 
Despite their deviation from their declared liberal principles and other 
shortcomings, republican liberal democracies are still quite useful for analyzing most 
western societies. Do we have any better model of democracy to characterize France 
or Denmark? We do not. Even imperfect republican liberal democracies adhere to the 
liberal principles of separation of ethnicity from the state, individual civil equality, 
tolerance, non-discrimination and substantial openness for orderly and peaceful 
change. 
 
C. Consociational Democracy 
The term consociational democracy was introduced in response to the wholesale 
failure of liberal democracies in the new, post-colonial states in Africa and Asia. The 
Anglo-Saxon, majoritarian type of democracy, which was imposed by the colonial 
                                                 
6
 While it always constitutes a challenge of the dominant cultural group and a demand from the 
state to recognize and support group differences, multiculturalism varies widely in import and political 
agenda. According to Joppke (2000), multiculturalism takes the form of a claim of group rights in the 
United States, an anti-colonial discourse and struggle in the United Kingdom and an objection to an 
ethnic nation in Germany. 
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powers on these states, collapsed soon after independence. Lijphart (1977), who first 
suggested and developed the new model, explained the failure by the lack of fitness of 
liberal democracy to deeply divided societies. 
Lijphart identified certain Western democracies as non-liberal, consociational (or 
semi-consociational) democracies, like Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and Finland. 
During the 1970s and 1980s a large literature emerged in which consociationalism 
was elaborated, applied to many historical and contemporary cases and criticized. In 
consociational democracy ethnic groups are recognized by the state and given all the 
necessary conditions, such as separate communities, language rights, schools and 
mass media, to preserve their separate existence and identity. Consociational 
democracy operates through the mechanisms of group autonomy, proportional 
representation, politics of compromise and consensus, coalition government (elite 
cartel) permanently engaged in negotiations, and veto power on decisions vital to 
group interests. The state takes a neutral stand toward the conflict between the groups 
and impartially implements the compromises reached by group elites. 
Lijphart maintains that consociational democracy is appropriate to societies with 
moderate ethnic differences and conflicts. While it cannot insure political stability in 
deeply divided societies, it stands a limited but better chance than any form of liberal 
democracy. He also argues that consociational democracy is fairer than the liberal 
type because it provides collective rights in addition to individual rights. 
Critics of consociational democracy advance several arguments. Some argue that 
consociationalism distorts democracy because recognition of group rights violates 
individual and human rights, and any allocation that is not fully meritocratic causes a 
waste of talents and skills (Glazer 1995). Others hold that consociational democracies 
are by nature stagnant, conservative, unable to handle change and hence unstable in 
the long run (e.g., the collapse of democracy in Lebanon as a result of the change in 
the demographic ratios of the communities; the perennial problems inflicting 
Belgium, Canada and India). Still others maintain that successful consociational 
democracies like Switzerland are territorial-confederal but, strictly speaking, not 
consociational (van den Berghe 1981). 
 
D. Multicultural Democracy 
The idea of multicultural democracy has risen as a corrective to the individualistic 
conceptualization of liberal democracy. It also emerged in North America and Europe 
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as a means to better understand the permanent inferior status of certain ethnic groups 
and their strong demand of cultural retention, representation and autonomy. More and 
more theoreticians and advocates of liberalism realize that equality between 
individuals cannot be achieved without recognizing and granting certain collective 
rights. Some supporters of liberal democracy presume that it could and should be 
expanded to include group rights because “the right to be different” is a basic human 
right, no less important than the right to conformity and civil and political rights 
(Young 1990). 
Multicultural democracy falls somewhere between liberal democracy (of the 
republican subtype) and consociational democracy. For this reason some, like 
Kymlicka (1995), portray it as another variant of liberal democracy, while others, like 
Yonah (1999), present it as a form of consociational democracy. Indeed, multicultural 
democracy is similar to liberal democracy in several respects. Both base full 
membership in the state on legal citizenship irrespective of ethnic descent. For both 
the organizing principle of society is the individual and in both the state does not 
institute any legal barrier against exogamy and free circulation of people. In both 
personal inter-mixing is a legitimate and attractive option, producing a variety of 
hyphenated and hybrid identities and at least some degree of assimilation. 
Van den Berghe (1999) stresses that multicultural democracy is appreciably less 
assimilating and less exclusionary than liberal democracy: “Multicultural democracy, 
by contrast, seeks to make room for cultural diversity without officializing it. It seeks 
solutions to the problem of integrating disparate groups into complex, urbanized, 
post-industrial societies while avoiding both the imposition of an assimilationist 
model based on a dominant-group definition of what the society should be, and the 
political expedient of disfranchising and excluding some groups from the polity and 
the society. It seeks to integrate without either assimilating or officializing cultural 
differences.” 
Multicultural democracy is also different from liberal democracy, and similar to 
consociational democracy, in other features. Multicultural democracy largely 
separates the nation from the state and hence makes the idea of “nation-state” 
unpersuasive and resistible. It is a means of denationalizing the state. As van den 
Berghe puts it: “Multicultural democracy differs from liberal democracy in that it 
decouples the concepts of nation and of state, and openly recognizes that the state in 
question is not ethnically homogeneous.” The nation is multicultural or multiethnic. 
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The state not only refrains from negating cultural diversity but also treats it favorably. 
Citizens not belonging to the majority nation and wishing not to assimilate can be 
equal and can feel fully identified with the state. Minorities are granted minimal 
collective rights to preserve their cultural heritage and to use their language in schools 
and other public bodies. The individual’s affiliation and allegiance both to the state 
(as a “super-community”) and to particular communities is strong and balanced. The 
cost of non-assimilation is moderate in multicultural democracy – smaller than in 
liberal democracy and greater than in consociational democracy. Furthermore, the 
notion of tolerance in multicultural democracy is grounded on “the agreement to 
disagree,” not on the liberal values of relativism, personal autonomy, critical thinking, 
the virtue of criticism, openness to new ideas, free expression, the benefit of cross-
fertilization, respect for the other, and the right to be wrong. 
Multicultural democracy is distinguished from consociational democracy in 
the degree of legislation of group differences and rights. To quote van den Berghe 
once again: “Maximalist multicultural democracy can be clearly differentiated from 
consociational democracy, in that the latter recognizes and institutionalizes 
communities and collective rights, thereby almost automatically establishing invidious 
distinctions between degrees of institutionalization and recognition for various 
communities, and unleashing a game of recognition-seeking between communities. 
Maximalist multicultural democracy, on the other hand, can easily stop short of any 
official recognition of group rights.” To illustrate, if the law allows prayers in schools, 
members of different religions have equal right to express their distinct culture 
without the state recognizing or favoring any specific religion. 
Multicultural democracy also differs from consociational democracy in 
completely lacking or in possessing only seminal forms of consociational 
mechanisms. It does not have any explicit and binding institutional arrangements of 
proportional representation, mandatory coalition governments, statutory ethnic 
autonomy, minority veto rights on vital matters, and avoidance of majoritarian 
decision-making (the politics of consensus, compromises and non-decisions). These 
formal rules, which are conducive to endemic disputes, stalemate and mediocrity in 
consociational democracies, are either absent or embryonic in multicultural 
democracies. For example, the inclusion of ethnic parties in coalition governments 
and the participation of minority members in the national power structure are likely 
legitimate options rather than legal requirements. 
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Some Western liberal democracies are clearly moving in this direction. Most 
striking is the Netherlands where non-white citizens from the former colonies are 
admitted to the society with little discrimination, granted rights to education in their 
own language, encouraged to keep their culture and identity and assisted in social 
mobility. The United Kingdom is another case in point. It devolved significant powers 
to Scotland and Wales. Blacks from the ex-Empire were allowed to enter Britain, their 
right to family unions and to a separate culture is recognized, and strong laws against 
racial discrimination are enacted and enforced. Post-apartheid South Africa is 
probably even a better case of multicultural democracy. While its governing 
institutions are based on the principle of liberal democracy, the federal state is 
officially multilingual and multicultural, giving some authority to traditional chiefs, 
and large minorities have an effective veto power on any amendment to the 
Constitution. In addition, the first interim government (1994-99) is by law coalitional 
(including a representative of any political party with 5 per cent or more of the votes 
in the national elections). New Zealand has drawn even further to multicultural 
democracy after recognizing the indigenous Maori as a national minority and granting 
them a full statutory, non-territorial autonomy (Mulgan 1989). 
The United States is a rather complex and ambiguous case. Its current 
Constitution makes it a pure individual liberal democracy. The reality for the big 
minorities, that is, white ethnics, Asians and Hispanics, is assimilation as individuals 
into the American mainstream. At the same time, the United States is a republican 
liberal democracy, a unilingual nation-state, established, shaped and ruled by the 
WASPs, the gatekeepers of society. Yet the United States is tilting toward 
multicultural democracy by formally practicing a policy of affirmative action in favor 
of non-whites and women, popularizing the idea of multiculturalism, granting Native 
Americans on the reservations certain collective rights and according Spanish-
speaking Puerto Rico a commonwealth status. The tolerance shown toward cultural 
and social separatists from among African-Americans is another sign of 
multiculturalism. 
Growing globalization and the expanding unification of Europe, with the added 
effect of the legacy of decolonization and galloping international tourism, are 
transforming Western liberal democracies into multicultural democracies. They move 
and mix diverse populations and make people keenly aware of their cultural 
uniqueness. At the same time they draw people together and diminish their 
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differences. Hyphenation and hybridization of identities, cultural shuttling, 
bilingualism and biculturalism are some of their products that reinforce multicultural 
democracy. They also engender the counter-effects of the rising radical right that 
opposes multiculturalism. 
 
7. Types of Quasi- or Non-Democracy 
There are several quasi- or non-democratic regimes that are specifically crafted to 
tackle deep ethnonational divisions. These are control, Herrenvolk democracy and 
ethnocracy. 

A. Control 
Investigating the political system that emerged during the 1960s in the 
Netherlands for regulating the conflict between Protestants and Catholics, Lijphart did 
not find liberal democracy applicable, and in response he invented the concept of 
consociational democracy in order to better account for the system there. Similarly, 
Lustick studied the division between the Jewish majority and Arab minority in Israel 
in the 1970s and had an experience reminiscent of Lijphart’s: He could not explain 
Arab acquiescence by liberal or consociational democracy. Instead, he introduced a 
new model of a political system that he called “control.” He set forth control as a 
general type, spelled out its mechanisms and applied it to Israel. 
Control is presented as a general system to obtain political stability in deeply 
divided societies, constituting an alternative to liberal and consociational democracy 
(Lustick 1979). The system is based on the principle that one ethnic group takes over 
the state, imposes its culture on the society, allocates to itself the lion’s share of 
resources and takes various measures to prevent the non-dominant group from 
organizing politically and threatening to upset the status quo. The control system 
consists of three interrelated mechanisms: isolation (denying the non-dominant group 
access to the dominant group and internally dividing and ruling it), economic 
dependence (making non-dominant members dependent on the dominant group for 
their livelihood and depriving them of the extra economic surplus necessary for 
waging continuous political struggle) and cooptation (the capture of non-dominant 
elites and leaders through partial dispensation of benefits and favors). 
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The control model was applied to various countries. Different versions of the 
model were applied to Israel within the pre-1967 borders by Lustick (1980)7 and by 
Smooha (1978, 1980a). The model was also applied to Northern Ireland by Smooha 
(1980b) and to Canada by Cannon (1982) and by McRae (1985).8 
Control is appropriate to societies where ethnic differences and conflicts are 
maximal and profound, a situation that cannot be handled, according to Lijphart, by 
either liberal or consociational democracy. While not advocating it, Lustick maintains 
that control also serves the non-dominant group by saving it the pains of instability, 
persecution, violence and bloodshed.9 
There is no clear relationship, however, between democracy and control. Most 
examples of control are non-democratic, including colonial states and apartheid South 
Africa. Lustick himself does not consider control as a stable democratic system, while 
he tends to regard liberal and consociational democracy as stable. Control is rather a 
set of mechanisms that can be used by democracies and non-democracies to contain 
dissident ethnic minorities. 
 
B. Herrenvolk Democracy 
Herrenvolk democracy is a democracy for the master race, formally excluding 
other groups. This model was originally introduced by van den Berghe (1967) and 
applied first to apartheid South Africa and then to the ante-bellum United States. 
van den Berghe’s characterization of the United States before the 1960s as 
Herrenvolk followed de Tocquville’s classic analysis of American society, where 
“tyranny of the majority” prevailed and Blacks were disenfranchised. This is a 
disputed classification, however, since the exclusion of Blacks was not built into the 
constitution of the United States but was the result of racist local regulations and 
practices. Full enfranchisement of Blacks in 1964 did not require a constitutional 
amendment. 
                                                 
7
 While in 1980 Lustick argued that the Arab minority was placed under control, toward the end of 
the 1980s he abandoned this model, claiming that Israel is becoming a de facto binational state in 
which the Arab minority is playing a deciding role in Israeli politics (Lustick 1987). 
8
 The application to Canada was limited to the period from independence in 1867 to the Quiet 
Revolution of the 1960s. During this time the dominant British majority used the state to make Canada 
British and to diminish any French power and features.  
9
 For a sharp criticism of this view, see McGarry and O’Leary 1993. 
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On the other hand, van den Berghe’s view of South Africa before 1994 as a 
Herrenvolk democracy is pertinent. Yet he belittled its democratic nature even for 
Whites and dismissed its ability to undergo peaceful change. In contrast, Adam 
analyzed South Africa also as a Herrenvolk democracy but stressed its genuine 
qualities as democracy for Whites. He successfully inferred its capability to 
peacefully transform itself into a democracy. Adam and Moodley (1993) argue that 
the new, post-apartheid South Africa stands a much better chance as a stable 
democracy because it has only to extend an existing democracy to new groups 
(Asians, Coloureds and Africans), rather than to meet the formidable challenge of 
building democracy from scratch as is the case for states of Black Africa. 
Benvenisti (1987) classifies Israel in its post-1967 borders as a Herrenvolk 
democracy. He argues that the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip were de 
facto annexed to Israel but are permanently disenfranchised. Jews rule Palestinian 
citizens and non-citizens and use the state as a vehicle of domination and exclusion. 
This classification is erroneous because Israel’s rule over the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip is internationally defined as a state of occupation and therefore the extension of 
political rights to their inhabitants is pointless. More importantly, the non-citizen 
Palestinians have always fought for liberation and sovereignty, not for becoming 
Israeli citizens. Hence, the analogy between Israel and South Africa is false. 
The cases of Estonia and Latvia are marginal and controversial. These two states 
won their independence from the Russian empire in 1918 but were reoccupied and 
incorporated into the Soviet Union during World War Two. When they became 
independent again in 1991, they had very large Russian-speaking minorities that had 
mostly arrived after 1940. In order to prevent these national minorities from blocking 
the project of building a nation-state, Estonia and Latvia invoked a doctrine of legal 
restorationism (return to the pre-1940 legal situation) to legitimate the denial of 
citizenship to post-1940 Russian-speaking immigrants and enacted restrictive 
naturalization laws, resulting in large non-citizen populations. The question whether 
these states are Herrenvolk democracies or not does not have a simple answer, and I 
will turn to it below in discussing Estonia. 
Although useful as a tool to analyze democracy in deeply divided societies, 
Herrenvolk democracy is evidently not a democracy. Scholars neither present it as a 
democracy nor advocate it as a temporary or permanent solution to deeply divided 
societies. 
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C. Ethnocracy 
Feeling disenchanted with “ethnic democracy” as a model for analyzing Israel, 
Yiftachel (1997) developed the existing term “ethnocracy” into a counter-model for 
studying Israel and some deeply divided societies. The main distinction between the 
two models lies in the nature of the regime: ethnocracy is construed to be a non-
democracy while ethnic democracy is conceptualized as a democracy. While Israel 
serves as a prime example, ethnocracy is also found in contemporary Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Estonia, Latvia and Serbia. 
According to Yiftachel: 
 
An ethnocracy is a non-democratic regime which attempts to extend or 
preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multiethnic 
territory. Ethnocracy develops chiefly when control over territory is 
challenged, and when a dominant group is powerful enough to 
determine unilaterally the nature of the state. Ethnocracy is thus an 
unstable regime, with opposite forces of expansionism and resistance 
in constant conflict (1999: 367-368). 
 
In ethnocracy, rights are determined by ethnonational descent, not by universal 
citizenship. The source of legitimacy of the regime is not the citizenry (“the demos”) 
but rather the dominant ethnic nation. Political boundaries are blurred by the state’s 
territorial expansion, the involvement of the ethnic Diaspora in state affairs and by 
exclusionary measures. The founding ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus 
and administers discriminatory policies toward other groups. A dichotomy separates 
the two ethno-nations of the settlers and indigenous, although both are at the same 
time internally divided into ethno-classes. Segregation is pervasive in all areas of life, 
including the economy, residence, politics and social classes. Three driving forces 
converge to create and to sustain ethnocracy: settler society, ethnonationalism and the 
ethnic logic of capital. They combine to discriminate and to exclude as well as to 
militate against democratization. 
Ethnocracy is non-democratic although it exhibits democratic features, like 
universal suffrage and democratic institutions. For this reason ethnocracy is not a 
Herrenvolk democracy. It maintains “selective openness,” mostly to obtain 
international legitimacy. It is not a true democracy because it lacks a “democratic 
structure.” Ethnocracy tends “to breach key democratic tenets, such as equal 
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citizenship, the existence of a territorial political community (the demos), universal 
suffrage, and protection against the tyranny of the majority” (Yiftachel 1999: 364). 
There are several problems with ethnocracy as a model. First, the generality and 
fitness of the model is dubious. For instance, Estonia and Latvia are not settler 
societies, in the usual sense that the founding Estonian and Latvian ethno-nations are 
not settlers. They do not expand territorially and do not have a Diaspora intervening 
in their internal affairs. It is also hard to see the economic factors underlying the 
exclusionary policies in these two countries. Although the model is based on the 
Israeli case, it is doubtful whether it properly applies to Israel. 
The model of ethnocracy is too rigid and one-sided. It presents the control of the 
founding ethno-class as hegemonic and cannot detect processes of erosion in its 
power and privilege. Protest of non-dominant groups is erroneously seen as 
ineffective because of the ample ability of the dominant group to contain it. The 
model is also wrong in seeing lower ethno-classes of the dominant ethno-nation as 
marginalized, whereas in reality they are quite privileged in comparison to members 
of the non-dominant ethno-nation. 
The main weakness of the model is, however, its over-demanding and unrealistic 
normative conception of democracy. A regime that is not civic in nature and does not 
provide full equality to all citizens and ethnic groups is deemed non-democratic. 
Public and elite commitment to democracy, universal suffrage, fair elections, free 
media, and full and effective use of means of democratic, non-violent struggle by 
non-dominant groups, to name just a few of the components of democracy, are treated 
as trivial and deceptive. This myopic view misses the essence of regimes that are 
characterized by an inherent contradiction between democratic and non-democratic 
tendencies but also by incremental change, flexibility and relative stability. These 
regimes are identified as ethnic democracies and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
8. Ethnic Democracy as a Model 
There are some democratic regimes that correspond neither to any of the four 
civic democracies in which the citizen or the citizenry is at the center nor to any of the 
three quasi- or non-democratic regimes discussed above. The founding rule of these 
regimes is ethnic – an ethnic nation or group. The name given to this type is “ethnic 
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democracy.”10 From the very beginning, this type was constructed as a “diminished 
type” of democracy, i.e. a mixed and low-grade type of democratic regime that lacks 
certain democratic elements. 
The initial version of the model of ethnic democracy was published for the first 
time in a book (Smooha 1989) and an article (Smooha 1990, followed by Smooha and 
Hanf 1992) of mine on Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.11 The model was elaborated 
and scattered during the 1990s. An extended theoretical version appeared in 1999 
(Smooha 1999). The model was used for a comparative study of several countries 
(Yiftachel 1993) and for a comparison between Israel and Northern Ireland (Smooha 
1997c). It was applied to Estonia and Latvia (G. Smith 1996), Estonia (Järve 2000), 
and Slovakia (Van Duin and Polackova 2000). Extensive applications of the model to 
Israel were published (Peled 1993; Smooha 1997c, 2000; Saban 2000), stirring rounds 
of heated controversies to be referred to below. 
 
A. Definition and Delineation 
Ethnic democracy is a democratic political system that combines the extension of 
civil and political rights to permanent residents who wish to be citizens with the 
bestowal of a favored status on the majority group. This is democracy that contains 
the non-democratic institutionalization of dominance of one ethnic group. The 
founding rule of this regime is an inherent contradiction between two principles – 
                                                 
10
 I used this name in 1989 without being aware that it was coined originally by Linz in 1975 to 
refer to a political system that is democratic for the dominant group but excludes, on the basis of 
ethnicity, other groups from the democratic process. In 1996 Linz and Stepan followed Linz’s original 
usage and employed the term (Type II, pp. 429-430) to essentially mean “Herrenvolk democracy”, 
which is a non-democratic system. 
11
 In my work on the status of the Arab minority in Israeli society, I explored the type of 
democracy prevalent in Israel within the pre-1967 borders. Originally I saw Israel as a Herrenvolk 
democracy vis-à-vis the Arab minority (Smooha 1978). I argued that while the Arabs formally enjoyed 
all the democratic rights, they were actually placed under control, excluded from the national power 
structure and their civil rights did not really matter. I concluded that Israeli democracy did not work for 
the Arabs. My fieldwork soon convinced me, however, that the models of Herrenvolk democracy and 
control were over-simplifications of a rather complex reality. Contrary to my prior conceptions and to 
the Herrenvolk democracy and control models, I found the Arabs to be strongly attached to Israel, 
believing in the effectiveness of Israeli democracy and engaged in a militant struggle for equality and 
peace without triggering repression on the part of the authorities. There was also ample evidence that 
by the late 1970s control over the Arabs eroded appreciably. 
Conceding that Herrenvolk democracy and control are not appropriate, I was left with liberal and 
consociational democracy. But both seemed to me far removed from Israeli reality. Despite all the 
improvements in its treatment of the Arabs, Israel still does not live up to the expectations of these two 
types of Western civic democracy. Like Lijphart and Lustick, I was forced to distinguish a new type 
which I called “ethnic democracy.” This model was construed as a generalized or universalized type of  
the Israeli case. 
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civil and political rights for all and structural subordination of the minority to the 
majority. “The democratic principle” provides equality between all citizens and 
members of society, while “the ethnic principle” establishes explicit ethnic inequality, 
preference and dominance. The organization of the state on the basis of this structural 
incompatibility constantly generates ambiguities, contradictions, tensions and 
conflicts, but not necessarily ethnic and political instability. The state belongs to the 
majority, not to all of its citizens, and the majority uses the state as a means to 
advance its national interests and goals. The minority encounters the hard problem of 
potential disloyalty to the state because it can neither be fully equal in nor fully 
identified with the state. Yet the democratic framework is real, not a façade. The 
conferral of citizenship on the minority enables it to conduct an intense struggle for 
fulfilling its rights and for improving its situation without fearing repression on the 
part of the state and majority. The state imposes various controls and restrictions on 
the minority in order to prevent subversion, disorder and instability. As a result, the 
status quo is preserved but over time the minority experiences a partial betterment of 
its status. 
One should not interpret the central contradiction between democracy and ethnic 
dominance, being built into ethnic democracy, as a contradiction that arises in all 
matters. There are matters for which the contradiction is not relevant at all, others in 
which it takes concrete and striking forms, and yet others in which it is reflected in 
varying degrees. The expressions of the contradiction also depend on perceptions, 
interpretations and attitudes of minority and majority, and not just on intractable and 
objective situations, and they can be shaped by state and public policies. 
What is deficient in ethnic democracies as compared to civic democracies? The 
fundamental deficiency is the lack of civil and political equality because the rights of 
the minority are inferior to the rights of the majority. The state belongs to the majority 
and serves it more than the minority. Being identified with the majority, not with its 
citizens, the state also does not try hard to obtain nor does it actually enjoy the 
legitimacy, consent and cooperation of all the ethnic groups living in its midst. 
Like all diminished types, ethnic democracy is also an incomplete case of 
democracy. If so, why should ethnic democracy not be regarded as “an extended type 
of non-democracy,” instead of “a diminished type of democracy”? This is because 
ethnic democracy shares greater ground with civic democracy than with non-
democracy. Ethnic democracy meets the procedural minimum definition of 
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democracy (civil and political rights for all permanent residents interested in them) 
and even excels in additional democratic properties: elite and public commitment to 
democracy and an effective struggle by the minority without state repression. 
The type of ethnic democracy broadens and enriches the comparative scheme of 
political regimes in divided societies but without stretching and obscuring the concept 
of democracy. It augments the researcher’s analytical differentiation by adding a type 
that diverges significantly from the common types of civic democracies, thereby 
refining the meaning of “full democracy.” It does not stretch and distort the concept 
of “democracy” because it does not misrepresent itself as an additional case of full 
democracy but rather as a diminished type only. 
 
B. Distinction from Other Types of Political Regimes 
Table 1 presents a comparison of the five types of democracy. The two liberal 
types are distinguished from the three other types in their non-recognition of cultural 
differences and denial of collective rights. Consociational democracy provides the 
minority with maximal recognition, separate institutions, autonomy, proportional 
representation and equal status. Multicultural democracy recognizes cultural 
differences and supports groups that organize separately, but does not legislate 
collective rights and does not extend self-rule and power-sharing. Ethnic democracy is 
selective in its approach to collective rights, denying collective rights that may 
empower the minority and reinforce the threat it presents to the majority. It is 
distinguished from the other four types in being ethnic, not civic. It takes the ethnic 
nation as the cornerstone of the state, not citizenry. It also differs from the rest on the 
question of equality. While the four civic types of democracy treat the minority 
equally, ethnic democracy grants individual and collective rights to the minority but 
also guarantees preferred status to the majority. Paradoxically, ethnic democracy is 
similar to republican liberal democracy in having the state side with the majority, 
whereas in the other three types the state remains neutral. 
It can be said, with some simplification, that while liberal democracy conforms to 
the idea of “equal and not separate,” multicultural democracy concurs with the vision 
of “equal but not so separate” and consociational democracy corresponds to the 
concept of “separate but equal,” ethnic democracy fits the pattern of “separate but not 
so equal.” 
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Table 1. Comparison between Types of Democracy 
 Individual 
Liberal 
Democracy 
Republican 
Liberal 
Democracy 
Multicultural 
Democracy 
Consociational 
Democracy  
Ethnic 
Democracy 
Procedural 
Minimum 
Definition of 
Democracy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State’s 
Character 
Collection of 
citizens 
Civic nation-
state 
Multicultural 
state 
Binational or 
multi-national 
state 
Ethnic 
nation-state 
Equality of 
Individual 
Rights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes To a large 
extent 
Collective 
Rights 
None None Yes, but not 
legislated 
Legislated Legislated 
Equality of 
Collective 
Rights 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Yes Yes No 
State’s 
Neutrality 
Yes No Yes Yes No 
Assimilation 
Policy 
No Yes No No No 
Assimilation 
Rate 
High High Medium Nil Varies 
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Mechanisms 
of 
Integration 
and 
Conflict-
Management 
Equality of 
individual 
rights and 
opportunities, 
constitutional 
patriotism, 
assimilation 
Equality of 
individual 
rights and 
opportunities, 
formation of 
a nation-state 
with cultural 
homogeneity 
and value 
consensus, 
assimilation 
Equality of 
individual 
rights and 
opportunities, 
formation of a 
common 
super-
community 
with 
recognition 
and 
cultivation of 
group cultural 
differences, 
some degree 
of 
assimilation 
Equality of 
individual 
rights and 
opportunities, 
agreement over 
a binational or 
multi-national 
state, 
proportional 
distribution of 
resources, 
extended 
autonomy, 
power-sharing, 
veto power, 
politics of 
compromise 
and consent 
Gradual 
decrease of 
inequality of 
individual 
rights and 
opportunities, 
broadening 
of collective 
rights, power 
and 
resoluteness 
of the 
majority, 
protest and 
struggle of 
the minority, 
control and 
deterrence of 
the state  
 
The table highlights the peculiarity and rationale of ethnic democracy, as evident 
in its features discussed below. 
 
C. Features 
In order to elucidate the special nature of ethnic democracy, some conceptual 
clarifications and distinctions are necessary. A “state” is a political juridical entity, 
whereas a “nation” is a collectivity of people. A “nation” is a population that claims a 
right to self-determination (to be fulfilled by autonomy or sovereignty) to a certain 
territory (considered as its homeland). An “ethnic nation” is a nation that in principle 
consists of a single ethnic group, whereas a “non-ethnic (civic) nation” is a nation that 
is or in principle can be composed of different ethnic groups. Since ethnic nation has 
rigid boundaries, it is extremely hard to join or leave it. The ethnic nation is further 
grounded in a myth of a common descent and a shared collective memory and often 
also a common language and a common culture. “Ethnic nationalism” 
(ethnonationalism) is a brand of nationalist ideology or movement claiming that a 
given group constitutes an ethnic nation (rather than a civic nation), and as such has a 
right to a certain territory. It usually also presumes that the ethnic nation has a distinct 
culture and language and certain collective goals to be preserved and promoted. When 
a preexisting ethnic nation founds a state, it tends to take precedence over the state’s 
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democratic system and institutions. On the other hand, a preexisting state tends to 
create a non-ethnic, civic nation.12 
The following features distinguish ethnic democracy from types of civic 
democracy and from types of non-democracy. They tend to characterize ethnic 
democracy but not all are equally essential, their presence may vary from one case to 
another, and some may even be missing. 
1. The dominant ethnic nationalism determines that there is only one ethnic nation 
that has an exclusive right to the country. The point of departure of ethnic democracy 
is the prevalence of ethnic nationalism that asserts an absolute, exclusive and 
indivisible right of an “ethnic nation” to a given country. From this assertion stems a 
dichotomy separating the core ethnic nation from non-core members who originate 
from other ethnic groups. Ethnic nationalism makes the ethnic nation a center of 
gravity for the society as a whole – a prime concern, a world interest and a precious 
asset for most members and leaders of the ethnic nation. 
Since ethnic nationalism asserts the ethnic nation’s inalienable right to a separate 
political entity and an exclusive right to the homeland, it legitimates inequality of 
status between the core ethnic nation and non-core groups. 
The idea of a single core ethnic nation, enshrined in ethnic nationalism, also exists 
in all types of quasi- and non-democracy – control, Herrenvolk democracy and 
ethnocracy. It is absent in liberal and multicultural democracies which do not have a 
core ethnic nation at all, while consociational democracies have more than one 
(ethnic) nation and hence lack a single ethnic core. 
2. The state separates membership in the single core ethnic nation from 
citizenship. The state accepts the claim of ethnic nationalism that the ethnic nation is 
the single core ethnic nation in the country, hence sharply marking it off from other 
ethnonational groups. The state tries hard to limit citizenship to members of the core 
ethnic nation, but citizenship is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
inclusion in the core ethnic nation. The core ethnic nation may include citizens and 
non-citizens, and by the same token the non-core population may also include citizens 
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 For discussion of the distinction between ethnic and civil nation and features of the ethnic 
nation, see Smith 1986 and Greenfeld 1992. 
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and non-citizens. Membership in the core ethnic nation is given, primordial and 
innate, though it could be achieved by a select few under certain conditions.13 
The state is primarily entrusted with the care of the core ethnic nation and only 
secondarily with the care of its non-core citizens. It is concerned with the preservation 
of the core ethnic nation and its members, even if they are non-citizens living 
permanently in the Diaspora. It may allow, encourage, or discourage the assimilation 
of non-core groups but always takes measures to prevent the assimilation, 
depopulation and decline of the core ethnic nation. 
The difference between the various types on this point is clear. While in ethnic 
democracy the state primarily serves the single core ethnic nation and only 
secondarily all its citizens, in individual liberal democracy the state serves the 
individual citizen and in republican liberal democracy it caters to all its citizens who 
by definition constitute its non-ethnic, civic nation. In the same vein, ethnic 
democracy differs from multicultural and consociational democracies, which treat all 
their citizens equally, including the members of their different constituent ethnic 
groups and nations. On the other hand, ethnic democracy considers the needs and 
interests of its citizens, while the various types of quasi- or non-democracy cater only 
to the members of the core ethnic nation and grossly disregard non-core citizens and 
non-citizens. 
In order to further clarify the first two features of ethnic democracy, let me 
illustrate their manifestations in civic democracies. Every state has an ethnic core that 
reflects the ethnic stock, language and culture of its population, majority, or charter 
(founding) group. For instance, the ethnic core of the United States is white, English-
speaking, Christian and western, mirroring its Anglo-Saxon founding group. For 
centuries this ethnic core was preserved by the depopulation of Native Americans, an 
immigration policy in favor of white Europeans, the denial of full political citizenship 
to African-Americans and other measures. Notwithstanding this ethnic core, the 
United States should not be considered an ethnic democracy because it lacks ethnic 
nationalism, has not institutionalized an ethnic nation, has not declared itself as the 
homeland of whites, WASPs or Christians, but rather has formed a multiethnic nation 
                                                 
13
 For instance, the standard way to join the Jewish people is through religious conversion. On the 
other hand, it is not clear how to join the German ethnic nation since it is not enough to acquire the 
German language and culture and to be a resident citizen in Germany. Intermarriage and blood ties are 
no doubt a step forward. 
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that includes all citizens by birth or naturalization. It has become even more civic and 
even multicultural following the enfranchisement of the Blacks, the liberalization of 
immigration policy and the growing acceptance of multiculturalism since the mid-
sixties. 
3. The state is owned and ruled by the core ethnic nation. It is the core ethnic 
nation that possesses and controls the state, not its citizens. The state is the 
embodiment of the core ethnic nation’s right to national self-determination, the state 
territory is the exclusive homeland of the core ethnic nation and the state apparatus is 
a tool at the disposal of the core ethnic nation to promote its collective goals and the 
security, welfare and success of its members. The state’s official language, religion, 
culture, institutions, flag, anthem, emblems, stamps, calendar, names of places, 
heroes, days and sites of collective commemoration, laws (especially those regulating 
naturalization, immigration and ownership of land and businesses) and policies are 
biased in favor of the core ethnic nation, and members of the core ethnic nation expect 
and receive a favored status. 
Ethnic democracy creates an ethnic stratification of citizenship. Members of the 
core ethnic nation are first-class citizens and only they have the option to define and 
contribute to the common good. The select few among them who make exceptional 
effort and contribute get the special privileges of “good citizens,” while the rest 
remain rank and file members. On the other hand, non-core members can hardly 
qualify as “good citizens,” i.e. they are entitled to take part in determining the 
common good (national goals and policies) but cannot enjoy the special rewards given 
for excellence in contributing to the public good.14 
The state in ethnic democracy is expressly on the side of the core ethnic nation, 
not operating as an impartial body, a fair broker, or an agreed upon arbiter for the 
population groups. In this respect, the state in ethnic democracy is similar to the state 
in non-democratic regimes. In ethnic democracy there is also no broad, shared and 
agreed upon civic infrastructure that contains language, culture and identity. Such an 
infrastructure is present in republican liberal democracy although here, too, the 
nation-state is not neutral but rather identified with the majority group. In contrast, the 
state in individual liberal democracy, multicultural democracy and consociational 
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democracy is in principle an impartial and autonomous organization, neutral to the 
groups in conflict, and attempting to administer its affairs in a fair manner, to mediate 
and to find mutually acceptable compromises. 
4. The state mobilizes the core ethnic nation. The state fosters the national identity 
of the members of the core ethnic nation in order to ensure against their apathy and 
assimilation. But beyond this minimal fundamental goal, the cultivation of an 
exclusionary national identity and the provision of preferential treatment of core 
ethnic nation members aim to obtain their full consent, legitimacy, identification, 
support, participation and sacrifice for national projects. The concrete state 
undertakings vary but the grand design is the continued construction or reconstruction 
of the core ethnic nation (ethnic nation-building) or a nation-state building, and 
defense against a perceived or real threat. Members of the core ethnic nation are 
called upon to contribute to and to make personal sacrifices for national interests and 
they are rewarded by special privileges. 
Since mobilization of the masses by the state is the characteristic of ideological 
societies, ethnic democracies are ideological states with relatively weak civic societies 
and vulnerable private domains. In this sense they resemble Herrenvolk democracies 
and differ markedly from civic democracies in which civic society and the private 
domain are broad and strong, national ideology is not obliging and mass mobilization 
is infrequent (usually occurs during wartime). 
5. The state grants non-core groups incomplete individual and collective rights. 
Ethnic democracy qualifies as a democracy because it meets the standard criterion of 
extending rights to the entire permanent population, including non-core groups. 
Certain rights might be either missing or not fully given. Four kinds of individual 
rights are granted: human rights (such as dignity, physical safety and equality), social 
rights (including entitlement to housing, health, employment, income and education), 
civil liberties (including freedom of assembly and association, freedom of the press 
and independent judiciary) and political rights (including the right to vote and to stand 
for election, a multi-party system, change of governments through fair elections and 
lack of military or foreign intervention in the political process). In addition, since non-
core groups are recognized by the state as distinct and separate groups, they are 
endowed with some collective rights. They are usually allowed to use their language 
and to hold separate religious institutions, schools and cultural organizations and 
activities. 
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The state in ethnic democracy sees political rights as an extremely pivotal 
privilege and practices a policy of restricting them as much as possible to core ethnic 
members. It extends, however, political rights to permanent residents and allows non-
core immigrants to naturalize under strict conditions due to the core nation’s 
commitment to democracy, international pressures, or other pragmatic reasons. 
Extension of political rights for all distinguishes ethnic democracy from non-
democracy.15 
On the one hand, ethnic democracy is inferior to civic democracies because full 
equality is by definition lacking and the core ethnic nation and its members enjoy 
superior status and rights. Whereas individual rights (including political ones) are 
equal for all in individual-liberal, republican-liberal, multicultural and consociational 
democracies, they are somewhat deficient in ethnic democracy. The individual rights 
of non-core members are limited to some extent and usually less protected. For 
instance, their right to purchase land may be subject to various restrictions. 
In contrast, with regard to collective rights, ethnic democracy is superior to 
individual-liberal democracy and republican-liberal democracy which in principle do 
not recognize any group right. The collective rights accorded in ethnic democracy are 
more extensive than in multicultural democracy but inferior to the full and equal 
group rights granted by consociational democracy. Unlike the binational nature of the 
state in consociational democracy, the state in ethnic democracy is uninational. It does 
not recognize the national rights of non-core groups, i.e. they are not accepted as 
national minorities with a representative leadership, entitlement to a proportional 
share of state resources (appointments, budgets), power-sharing, autonomy and a veto 
power on crucial decisions. Restrictions are also put on the expression of the national 
identity of non-core groups. For example, there are restrictions on the public display 
of identification with the external homeland and on school curricula of the national 
history and literature. 
6. The state allows non-core groups to conduct parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary struggle for change. Another democratic dimension of ethnic 
democracy is the availability and legitimacy of standard avenues of protest and 
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struggle for change for use by non-core groups. They are allowed to use the vote, 
petitions, mass media, courts, political pressures, interest groups, lobbies, 
demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins and other legal means to advance their status without 
having to face repression by the state and violence by the core ethnic nation. 
On this score ethnic democracy is far superior to quasi- or sham democracies 
where the fundamental right to protest and dissent is not respected. But in ethnic 
democracies this right, among others, is more restricted for non-core groups than in 
civic democracies. 
7. The state perceives the non-core groups as a threat. The state and the core 
ethnic nation perceive the non-core groups as a threat. The threat may vary 
considerably in nature (real or apparent) and contents. Threats may include 
demographic increase and preponderance (swamping), excessive accumulation of 
political power, unfair economic competition, downgrading of the national culture, 
dilution of the “pure ethnic stock,” a national security risk, loyalty to an external 
homeland, subversion, unrest and instability. 
Perceived or real threats are widespread in all types of democracy, but only in 
ethnic democracy and quasi- or non-democracies are they an integral part of the 
system, enduring and obsessive. 
8. The state imposes some control on-core groups. Since members of non-core 
groups suffer from personal and institutional discrimination, cannot enjoy full 
equality and cannot completely identify themselves with the state, their loyalty is 
considered problematic. They are also perceived as a threat to the order and stability 
of society. Moreover, their protest and struggle are feared of leading to escalating 
demands and to illegal actions and violence. Even if the historical record shows that 
they are by and large law-abiding people, their disloyalty potential is assessed to be 
significant, and occasional incidents of law violation on their part reinforce suspicion 
and apprehension. For this reason non-core groups in ethnic democracy are targets of 
the security forces. Their participation in the security apparatus, access to sensitive 
information and recruitment to posts of trust are restricted. They are watched by state 
agencies and the activities of their activists and leaders are monitored. Restrictions are 
also imposed from time to time on their protest lest it deteriorates to unrest and 
violence. 
Control is commonly used in civic democracies against individuals and selected 
action-groups with high risk to the regime and to law and order, but in ethnic 
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democracy and quasi- and non-democracies control is also applied as a rule over non-
core groups as such, not just over particular members from among them. Average 
non-core members in diminished democracies and non-democracies are much more 
likely to get the attention and harassment of the security forces than average core 
members. 
Each of the above features of ethnic democracy readily distinguishes it from the 
existing political systems: civic democracies and quasi- or non-democracies. Ethnic 
democracy is not liberal because it is overwhelmed by excessive ethnic nationalism, it 
sharply distinguishes between members of the core and non-core ethnic nation, 
officially recognizes ethnic differences and extends group rights, puts the ethnic 
nation above citizenry and state, provides the core ethnic nation with institutionalized 
power and privilege and places the non-core groups under control. 
The comparison with multicultural democracy is rather complex. On the one hand, 
ethnic democracy is less democratic than multicultural democracy for non-core 
members concerning equality of individual rights and inclusion into society. On the 
other, it is more democratic in giving more extensive and legalized collective rights to 
non-core groups. 
Although ethnic democracy makes concessions to the non-core groups, it is not 
consociational because the state is by definition appropriated and ruled by the core 
ethnic nation, and the non-core groups are deprived of full rights, equal status, 
proportional representation, veto power and politics of compromise and non-decision. 
The non-core groups remain on the receiving end and must constantly be on the guard 
to ensure their due rights and entitlements. 
Ethnic democracy differs from control as a type of regime in being clearly 
democratic, while in most cases control is not democratic. Whereas in the regime of 
control, ethnic dominance takes precedence over democratic rules, in ethnic 
democracy the democratic and ethnic principles compete with each other, but neither 
has a clear upper hand. Yet a mechanism, not a regime, of control is a necessary 
component of ethnic democracy. A certain degree of political and economic 
regulation of the non-core groups is essential for keeping ethnic dominance. Unlike 
control as a type of regime, control in ethnic democracy operates as a subtle, 
manipulative, selective and hidden mechanism in deterring and restraining dissidents 
and suspected troublemakers from among the minority. 
  36 
Ethnic democracy differs from ethnocracy in being more truly democratic and in 
producing real dilemmas as a result of clashes between democracy and structured 
ethnic dominance. It provides the non-core groups with more political participation, 
influence, and improvement of status than ethnocracy supposedly does. 
Being a democracy for all, ethnic democracy is not a Herrenvolk democracy 
which is by definition a democracy officially limited to the core ethnic nation only. 
 
D. Factors Conducive to Emergence 
The following factors are conducive to the emergence of ethnic democracy: 
1. Ethnic dominance precedes emergence of democracy. Democratizing ethnic 
states, in which the core ethnic nation has enjoyed institutionalized supremacy long 
before the introduction of democracy, are highly susceptible to ethnic democracy 
because it provides some continuity with the past. Instead of renouncing their 
traditional, structured dominance, core ethnic nations can make the new democracy 
serve them in a form of ethnic democracy. Ethnic democracy moderates the process of 
democratization. 
2. Ethnic nationalism precedes emergence of democracy. If a movement or 
ideology of ethnic nationalism precedes the existence of the state, there is a strong 
tendency that the new state will be ethnic or will adopt ethnic democracy as its 
regime. This is because the ultimate end of ethnic nationalism is advancement of the 
ethnic nation, neither quality of the regime, nor civil equality, nor justice. Ethnic 
democracy emerges where the ethnic nation rose prior to the formation of the state 
and founded the state to ensure its survival, well-being and interests. On the other 
hand, civic democracies rise where the state preceded the nation and created the civic 
nation as an instrument of societal solidarity and integration and as a tool of a state 
capitalist economy. 
These two factors indicate that high appreciation of the ethnic nation is a strong 
push for establishing ethnic democracy. For historical reasons, they prevail more in 
Central Eastern Europe than in the West (A. Smith 1986, 1998). The predisposition in 
Central Eastern Europe to ethnic democracy is related to its historical development: 
ethnic nationalism and ethnic nations preceded the proclamation of independent 
states, and democratization took place in states in which ethnic dominance had been 
consolidated. On the other hand, the states in the West are older and they created 
nationalism and built civic-territorial nations. 
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3. Real threat that requires continuous and broad mobilization. When a danger is 
posed to the physical, demographic, cultural, or economic existence and well-being of 
the ethnic nation and prolonged and mass mobilization of members of the ethnic 
nation is needed to secure its survival, there is a tendency to use the ethnic nation as 
an effective means of mobilization to contain the threat. In other words, when the 
nation lives in a hostile environment and the minority constitutes part of this 
environment, the state may shape its regime according to patterns of ethnic 
democracy to be able to cope successfully with the external and internal threat. Grave 
concern with national security generates and propels ethnic democracy. 
4. Commitment to democracy. The ethnic nation has an ideological or pragmatic 
commitment to democracy. This commitment is not absolute but rather competes with 
other superior values or needs, including the promotion of the ethnic nation and 
containment of the threat directed against it. Ethnic democracy is a compromise 
between these conflicting values. Lack of commitment to democracy is liable to 
engender quasi- or non-democracy. 
 
E. Conditions of Stability 
The conditions that sustain ethnic democracy are numerous. None is either 
necessary or sufficient. Some of them are: 
1. The core ethnic nation constitutes a solid numerical majority. When the core 
ethnic nation constitutes a demographic majority, it can rule democratically on its 
own without the necessary political support and legitimacy of the non-core groups 
(“the tyranny of the majority”). Lijphart lists this condition as inimical to stable 
consociational democracy but precisely for this reason it serves ethnic democracy 
well. The larger and more united the majority (over 80 per cent), the greater the 
chances of ethnic democracy to survive and keep stability. 
2. The non-core population constitutes a significant minority. Minorities 
numbering from 10 to 20 per cent of the total population are significant. It is 
sometimes possible to disregard or repress, with a bearable cost, a minority of under 
one-tenth. On the other hand, a minority of over one-quarter is too large to be 
included in an ethnic democracy because it can use its numerical and electoral 
strength to undermine the majority’s dominative system. When the minority is too 
small or very easy to manage, ethnic democracy is not necessary or may be concealed 
as a liberal democracy. 
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These figures are estimates which may vary from one situation to another 
depending on other factors. For example, a self-conscious and well-organized 
minority may definitely be significant even though its share of the total population is 
under one-tenth, while a minority of over one-quarter that lacks strong political 
consciousness and organization may be insignificant. To achieve stability where non-
core minorities are sizeable and mobilized, ethnic democracies are predisposed to 
deny full political rights to as many non-core members as possible. 
3. The core ethnic nation has a commitment to democracy. Without the core 
ethnic nation’s commitment to democracy, ethnic democracy will degenerate into a 
non-democracy. The commitment may be either ideological, or due to expediency or 
necessity (e.g., international pressure). Since the core ethnic nation also wishes to 
keep its control of the state and to preserve its favored status, it reluctantly turns to 
ethnic democracy as a pragmatic solution to its contradictory interests. 
4. The core ethnic nation is an indigenous group. An indigenous status, whether 
firmly grounded in centuries-old residence in the homeland or anchored in historical 
rights of a returning Diaspora, may serve as a basis for validating superior claims by 
the core ethnic nation.16 
5. The non-core groups are immigrant. Since immigrant groups, even with a 
seniority of several generations, have fewer claims to their new homeland and to the 
state than native groups, it is easier to restrict their rights and to subject them to ethnic 
democracy than indigenous non-core groups. 
6. The non-core population is divided into more than one ethnic group. Ethnic 
conflict is more intense in societies which are bi-ethnic, i.e. they are divided between 
the core ethnic nation and one big non-core group. It is easier to control a number of 
small minorities than one substantial minority. 
7. The core ethnic nation has a sizeable, supportive Diaspora. The need to protect 
and to repatriate the Diaspora can become a sufficient ground, in the eyes of the core 
ethnic nation, to prefer the Diaspora to the non-core inhabitants. This view facilitates 
the establishment of an ethnic democracy. 
8. The nature of involvement of the external homeland. The chances of ethnic 
democracy to achieve stability would be better if the external homeland (the country 
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of the nation to which the non-core population belongs) does not intervene on behalf 
of the minority or does not take actions to subvert ethnic democracy. 
9. The nature of the international involvement. If the international community 
gives legitimacy to the particular system of ethnic democracy or refrains from 
delegitimization of this system and from interceding on behalf of the minority, the 
chances of the regime to be stable are improved. The international community 
intervenes in cases of gross infractions of human rights or denial of individual 
political rights (disenfranchisement), but increasingly also when minority rights are 
blatantly violated, or following intervention by the external homeland that may 
destabilize the global state system. 
These conditions are not meant to be a list of generalizations, each of which to be 
tested separately. The listing aims, rather, to inform and to sensitize historical and 
comparative studies of some of the factors that are worth examining in order to 
understand the development and sustainability of ethnic democracies. 
 
F. Mini-Model 
The following is a condensed version that captures the essential elements of the 
model of ethnic democracy.  
 
Features 
1. Ethnic ascendancy. The central idea of ethnic democracy is the existence of an 
ideology or a movement of ethnic nationalism that declares a certain 
population as an ethnic nation sharing a common descent (blood ties), a 
common language, and a common culture. This ethnic nation owns a certain 
territory that is considered as its exclusive homeland. It also owns a state in 
which it exercises its right to self-determination. The ethnic nation, not the 
citizenry, shapes the symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit of 
the majority. This ideology makes a crucial distinction between members and 
non-members of the ethnic nation. Non-members are the others, some kind of 
outsiders, less desirable persons that cannot be full members of the society and 
state. Citizenship is separate from nationality, neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for membership in the ethnic nation. 
2. Perceived threat. Non-members of the ethnic nation are not only considered 
less desirable but are also perceived as a serious threat to the survival and 
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integrity of the ethnic nation. The threat can be one of a combination of 
biological dilution, demographic swamping, cultural downgrading, security 
danger, subversion and political instability. All kinds of restrictions and 
controls are imposed to contain the minority’s threat potential. 
3. Diminished type of democracy. Democracy is the political system prevailing in 
the state. All permanent residents who so wish are granted citizenship, 
including human, social, civil, and political rights. Minority citizens are 
allowed to conduct an intense struggle for equal rights without facing state 
repression. They are also permitted to join coalitions with majority groups and 
are granted autonomy with certain limits. Democracy is, however, diminished 
by the lack of equality of rights. Non-members of the ethnic nation enjoy 
incomplete rights and are discriminated against by the state. The state 
measures to prevent them from realizing their perceived threat potential 
compromise rule of law and quality of democracy. Democracy is constituted 
and functions as “a defensive democracy,” a political system designed to deter 
and to outlaw highly threatening groups. Considerations of national survival 
and security predominate. 
Ethnic democracy meets the procedural minimum definition of democracy, but in 
quality falls short of the civil types of democracy prevalent in the West. It is a 
diminished type of democracy because it suffers from an inherent contradiction 
between ethnic ascendancy and civil equality. The state is geared to privilege the 
majority and to advance its interests rather than to serve all its citizens equally. The 
minority cannot fully identify itself with the state, cannot be completely equal to the 
majority and cannot confer full legitimacy on the state. 
 
Factors Conducive to Emergence 
1. Ethnic nation precedes the ethnic state. The relatively older ethnic nation 
creates and shapes the relatively new state. Hence the ethnic nation is superior 
to the state. 
2. The ethnic nation experiences a threat. 
3. The majority is committed to democracy for ideological or practical reasons. 
4. The small or manageable size of the minority allows the majority to maintain 
both democracy and to keep ethnic ascendancy. 
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A combination of these factors encourages the rise of an ethnic democracy rather 
than either a form of civil democracy or non-democracy. 
 
Conditions of Stability 
1. A clear and continued numerical and political majority of the ethnic nation. 
2. A continued threat perceived by the majority. 
3. Non-interference of the “external homeland,” i.e. the foreign state to which the 
minority belongs nationally and which it regards as an ethnic patron. 
4. Non-intervention or even extension of legitimacy and support by the 
international community (foreign states and NGOs engaged in the protection 
of human and minority rights). 
 
G. Subtypes 
It is possible to discern three subtypes of ethnic democracy according to their 
location on the consociational – Herrenvolk democracy continuum. 
1. Standard ethnic democracy. This is the subtype that is presented above. It is 
located in the middle between consociational and Herrenvolk democracy. 
2. Hardline ethnic democracy. This subtype draws near Herrenvolk democracy. 
Very limited individual and collective rights are granted to the non-core citizens, the 
freedom to conduct parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle is quite restricted, 
the minority’s threat is perceived as grave and immediate, and the control exercised 
by the authorities is strict and comprehensive. In addition, non-core citizenship is 
weak but not absent as in Herrenvolk democracy. 
3. Improved ethnic democracy. This subtype approaches consociational 
democracy. Equal and common civility is expanded and strengthened. The non-core 
minority is accorded broad individual and collective rights, including institutional 
autonomy and some political representation. The minority’s protest and struggle for 
equality are intense and meet with some understanding, goodwill, willingness to talk 
and to negotiate, and actual significant concessions. The threat posed by the minority 
is perceived as potential and significant, but neither clear nor immediate. Control is 
also no longer comprehensive, but rather selective and appropriate. Non-core 
citizenship is real but devoid of full equality of individual and minority rights. 
All these upgraded features are only buds, not mechanisms, of consociational 
democracy. Despite all the headway made in comparison to the standard version, 
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improved ethnic democracy remains without full power-sharing, without a system of 
proportional allocation of resources, without full ethnonational autonomy, without a 
routine of negotiation and compromise as a rationale of the regime, and without a veto 
power. 
 
H. Issues 
The model of ethnic democracy raises three fundamental issues: legitimacy, 
stability and efficiency. It is argued that democrats, be they scholars, libertarians, or 
members of non-core groups, cannot accept ethnic democracy as legitimate because it 
is not a real or good democracy. Endemic instability is another basic flaw attributed to 
ethnic democracy. Because of its alleged illegitimacy and instability, ethnic 
democracy is deemed to be an ineffective mode of ethnic regulation. Let me take up 
these objections one by one. 
1. Lack of legitimacy. Many object to and feel annoyed by the very term “ethnic 
democracy” because it is allegedly not a genuine democracy. It is assumed that any 
system that does not intend to provide complete equality and full rights to the entire 
citizenry is not a democracy. The disqualification of ethnic democracy is not due to 
actual inequality, discrimination and restriction of rights, a widespread phenomenon 
in all types of democracy, but rather due to the assumption that equality in ethnic 
democracy is impossible and the state is inherently unfair. It is further argued that 
ethnic democracy and Herrenvolk democracy are equally non-democratic because 
they share hegemonic control and tyranny of the majority. They differ in tactics only: 
when the minority is small and manageable, the majority uses ethnic democracy, but 
when the minority is too large or unruly, the majority is forced to resort to outright 
Herrenvolk democracy. Ethnic democracy is always preferable due to its democratic 
façade, and it is retained only as long as the majority is able to exercise its hegemony. 
These arguments are maintained by several critics. Neuberger’s criticism is typical 
of mainstream liberal scholars. He holds that ethnic democracy is not democracy 
because according to the procedural minimum definition, stated by Zakaria (1997), in 
a democratic regime all citizens can enjoy full rights, and the equality of rights they 
enjoy does not stand in contradiction with any hierarchical principle – two basic 
requirements that are not met by ethnic democracy. With regard to the compromise 
between the democratic regime and the ethnic state inherent in ethnic democracy, 
Neuberger says: 
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If this is a compromise, then this is no longer ‘an additional type of 
democracy’. This is a compromise between democracy and something 
else, something in between, a semi-democracy (Neuberger 1999: 107). 
 
If the contradiction between democratic rights and ethnic dominance is so 
substantive, then the regime is not democratic. Neuberger is aware of the flaws in 
existing democratic regimes, but he considers them as non-substantive, corrigible 
deviations. He prefers to call these regimes “democracies with stains”: 
 
The concept of ethnic democracy gives legitimacy to any offence 
against democracy, while the concept ‘democracy with stains’ implies 
that there are stains but these are stains of democracy, deviations from 
the liberal democratic model (ibid). 
 
According to Neuberger, any democracy can improve by making a constant effort 
of cleansing itself of its stains. 
Ghanem, Rouhana and Yiftachel (1999) level similar criticism, but their point of 
departure is a more comprehensive and demanding definition of democracy. They 
demand that democracy should meet the necessary condition of full equality of rights 
both on the individual level and on the ethnic group level. In their opinion, ethnic 
democracy is disqualified because according to its very definition, it is impossible that 
minority rights are equal to majority rights. Instead of ethnic democracy, they propose 
the terms “ethnic state” or “ethnocracy” in order to stress the non-democratic 
character of the regime. They are convinced that the only type of regime appropriate 
to a divided society is consociational democracy. 
According to another criticism related to the issue of legitimacy, ethnic democracy 
is a normative model, as any model of democracy is. As such, it gives legitimacy to 
this flawed ethnic regime by defining it as a democracy and by presenting it to 
democratizing states as a model for emulation. In other words, it is argued that by 
distinguishing ethnic democracy as a separate type, calling it a democracy, putting it 
at the same level as a liberal, multicultural and consociational democracy, and by 
showing various cases as fitting the model, ethnic democracy implicitly receives a 
legitimacy it does not deserve. 
These critical points are made by a few social critics. Yonah (1999) condemns 
ethnic democracy for serving primarily not as a scientific analytical device, but rather 
as a disguised tool for legitimizing a bad system of quasi-democratic and hegemonic 
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control. In the opinion of Bishara (1996), this model, although it meets the procedural 
minimum definition of democracy and fits well the reality in certain countries, 
including Israel, is “dangerous” because “it perpetuates the reality instead of 
criticizing it” (Bishara 1999: 113). Ethnic democracy should rather be singled out as a 
sham democracy, in need of replacement by another true type of civic democracy. 
The delineation of the model as a legitimate democratic type is actually an act of 
publicity and promotion, making ethnic democracy available and exportable to states 
in process of democratization, instead of encouraging them to adopt an existing, 
genuine, civic type of democracy. The investigator should formulate models critically 
to further social change and improve the quality of democracy. Bishara proposes the 
model of multicultural democracy as a critical and even revolutionary model for 
Israel. 
In response to these objections, let us recall that democracy is not an all-or-
nothing category but rather a continuum on which full democracy and full non-
democracy are two poles. The transition on the scale, as in any other concept, from 
democracy to non-democracy is hard to pinpoint. The procedural minimum definition 
is set to mark off the crossing of a threshold to democracy. The requirement of 
democratic inclusiveness set forth by Dahl (1971) is met by ethnic democracy, which 
extends civil and political rights to the entire permanent population, including the 
non-core groups. Also satisfied are the demands for the possibility to conduct a legal 
struggle and the likelihood to affect change. In other words, it is not the philosophical 
principle of absolute equality which should be the decisive consideration but rather 
the concrete implementation of rights, the openness for protest and struggle, and the 
amenability of the system for significant change. As in many other cases, whether a 
given system is an ethnic democracy or actually a Herrenvolk democracy is an 
empirical question on which judgments can expectably and legitimately differ. 
Neuberger’s criticism is puzzling because according to the procedural minimum 
definition that he adopts, there is no explicit demand for equality of rights nor an 
express requirement of lack of inherent contradiction between principles. His 
suggestion to use the term “(liberal) democracy with stains” in lieu of ethnic 
democracy should be rejected because the former is not a liberal democracy with a 
correctable deviation but rather a different type of democratic regime. Ethnic 
democracy is not a civic democracy because it puts members of the ethnic nation at 
the center and grants them priority over the citizenry. 
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The criticism of Ghanem, Rouhana and Yiftachel (1999) should also be rejected 
because it is based on an over-demanding conception of democracy. Their definition 
calls for equality of individual and group rights, which is missing in ethnic 
democracy. Yet individual-liberal democracy and republican-liberal democracy, 
starring in most western countries, also do not meet this high requirement because 
they formally deny group rights to all, although informally the nation-state is shaped 
by the standards, needs and desires of the majority group. One wonders why these 
critics do not reject these two types of liberal democracy. After all, with all its 
shortcomings, ethnic democracy is superior to liberal types of democracy in according 
recognition and certain collective rights to non-assimilating minorities. 
As to the criticism that ethnic democracy is a disguised, counterproductive, 
normative model, it must be emphasized that it is designed as a strictly scientific 
model. Historically the model of ethnic democracy was formulated to overcome the 
inability to satisfactorily classify some political systems rather than to rationalize a 
certain regime (for example Israel, Northern Ireland). The primary use of the model is 
scientific. Without ethnic democracy as a distinct type, some political systems would 
erroneously be classified as Herrenvolk, consociational, multicultural, or liberal. 
Admittedly, there is no way, nonetheless, to avoid ascribing a normative 
component to ethnic democracy as to any scientific model. Yet, the conceptual 
distinction between existence and quality of democracy makes it possible to make a 
value judgment on ethnic democracy. One can reject ethnic democracy as a sore evil 
even if it is classified as a type of democracy, as Herrenvolk democracy is not 
considered democracy despite its deceptive name. The question is, however, not only 
semantic and normative, but also substantive. Underlying the term ethnic democracy 
is a scientific and normative assumption that ethnic democracy is indeed democracy 
in spite of its low quality. It is true that some legitimacy is bestowed on ethnic 
democracy by its very definition as democracy, but as long as it meets the 
requirements of democracy, it deserves the credit. 
The equation of ethnic democracy with Herrenvolk democracy does not only 
entangle right and wrong but also negates the scientific merit of ethnic democracy. 
Suppose ethnic democracy, like Herrenvolk democracy, is not democracy. In this case 
it would not have been problematic or full of internal contradictions on the one hand, 
and would not allow ethnic minorities to come to terms with it and the international 
community to recognize it, on the other. The thrust of ethnic democracy is the 
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fundamental contradiction and the unrelenting tension between the principle of rights 
for all and the principle of institutionalized ethnic dominance, that are interwoven in it 
and engendering ambiguities, uncertainties and confusion in the political system. This 
structural duality is missing in Herrenvolk democracy because it is not a democracy 
and not pretending to be so. The extension of citizenship and political rights to ethnic 
minorities, even with an intention to control and exclude them, creates an unintended 
dynamics of democratization that is absent in Herrenvolk democracy. Enfranchised 
minorities in nominal democracies can employ democratic procedures to implement 
their rights and to improve their status. Critics posit the untenable presupposition that 
political citizenship is meaningless in non-authoritarian or democratic regimes. 
It is possible to use ethnic democracy, like other scientific concepts, both to justify 
and to censure it. Critics should equally benefit from the sketch of a distinct type of 
ethnic democracy. A widely recognized distinct type is a more convenient target for 
attacks because of its low quality and other failings. It is also easier to use it as a bad 
example that democratizing states are warned against considering and adopting. 
The criticism against the low quality of ethnic democracy should, however, be put 
in proportion. It must be viewed against the classical types of liberal democracy that 
deny collective rights to minorities, do not grant them the necessary institutional 
arrangements for self-preservation and produce high rates of assimilation. Non-
assimilating minorities who cherish their separate existence are forced to endure the 
heavy pressures of assimilation that characterize liberal democracies, while they do 
not face this problem in ethnic democracies. 
There might be an important implication of the stand on the legitimacy of ethnic 
democracy for conflict-management. Critics that condemn ethnic democracy as a non-
democracy declare the regime as illegitimate and the peaceful means to transform it as 
futile. They ipso facto justify the use of non-democratic measures and even violence 
to undermine such a regime (Gavison 1999). This call for radical politics can be 
condoned if critics are definitely certain that the regime is non-democratic and should 
be fought with all means necessary. Yet, ethnic democracy should be given the 
benefit of the doubt thanks to its selected democratic features.17 
                                                 
17
 Ethnic democracy is apparently compatible with both the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages (1991) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (1995) of the Council of Europe. This can be deduced from the fact that almost all states in 
Central Eastern Europe signed these agreements and some of them are or are becoming ethnic 
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2. Instability. Ethnic democracy is criticized as a regime that is not and cannot be 
stable because of its built-in contradictions. It will either be downgraded to 
authoritarian control or upgraded to consociational democracy, but it cannot remain as 
it is over an extended period of time. 
The sources of instability are varied. The state promises equality to the minority 
but provides only partial equality. The minority is granted citizenship but is treated as 
a threat and sometimes even as an enemy. The minority cannot be equal and cannot be 
identified with a state that is not considered as its own. A permanent source of 
instability is the denial of legitimacy by the non-core groups. The state does not even 
make a serious effort to secure their consent and moral endorsement. Another 
important cause for the endemic instability is the inability of the system to satisfy the 
basic human needs of respect, belonging, identity and equality of non-core members 
(Rouhana and Ghanem 1998; Rouhana 1997). Moreover, many problems of the non-
core groups are left unattended, breeding widespread distress and disaffection. 
Yiftachel (1993) argues that ethnic democracy prevails under adverse 
circumstances, such as substantial cultural diversity, deep disputes and two 
indigenous groups vying for control. As a long-term model, it can be viable in states 
where the non-core groups are immigrant and the core ethnic nation faces more than 
one non-core group, but this situation is rare. Yiftachel concludes that “when the 
ethnic democracy model was implemented in bi-ethnic homeland states (Type 1), 
such as Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Sri Lanka, minority grievances were mobilized 
to break down social and political orders effectively;” “long-term political 
(democratic) stability has been achieved in bi-ethnic-homeland states (Type 1) only 
when consociational policies have been put to practice, as exemplified by the cases of 
Belgium and Switzerland” (Yiftachel 1993: 129). 
In response to these objections, it must be emphasized that ethnic democracy does 
indeed suffer from a certain degree of instability, but this is the fate of all democracies 
in deeply divided societies. The scale of diversity and discord in these societies is 
beyond the capability of any democratic regime to manage. Consociational 
democracy is not a panacea and has not proven itself stable even at the medium 
conflict level of Canada and Belgium. 
                                                                                                                                            
democracies. Slovakia and Estonia, for instance, are not called to amend the preamble to their 
constitutions that declare them as ethnic democracies. 
  48 
On the other hand, one should not underestimate the viability of ethnic 
democracy. Its stability is a function of the conditions detailed above, resulting in 
disintegration when they weaken or disappear. The destabilizing factors are 
counterbalanced by stabilizing forces. Ethnic democracy has a leeway and flexibility 
of acquiring stability by making concessions to minority groups. It is also buttressed 
by strong support, high legitimacy and determination of the core ethnic nation. The 
ambiguity and flexibility of the system encourage compliance and pragmatism among 
non-core groups. The possibility given to them to conduct a struggle and to score 
partial gains soft-pedals radicalism. The sharp asymmetry of power between core and 
non-core groups serves as an effective deterrence. The machinery of control also 
deters and stifles opposition. 
3. Inefficiency. The efficiency of ethnic democracy as a regime for managing and 
reducing internal conflicts is questioned. Critics argue that this model is inefficient 
because it is neither legitimate nor stable. 
In addressing this objection, it is worth repeating that ethnic democracy can 
moderate intergroup conflicts. It can shift from the hardline subtype to the standard 
subtype and even to the improved subtype. In all its subtypes, ethnic democracy is a 
better option than non-democratic ways, such as genocide, population transfer and 
domination, to settle deep differences between ethnonational groups. On the other 
hand, ethnic democracy regulates the conflict between majority and minority but 
leaves intact the deep cleavage and the fundamental dispute. 
 
9. Cases of Ethnic Democracy 
In order to further illustrate the relevance of ethnic democracy as an analytical and 
empirical tool, I will apply the mini-model in detail to Israel, in a condensed form to 
Slovakia and Estonia, and in a snapshot to Northern Ireland (1921-72), Poland (1918-
35) and Malaysia. 
 
A. Israel18 
Most observers see Israel as a special or mixed case with regard to its political 
system, economy and protracted conflict with the Arab world (Arian 1985). Despite 
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 For a systematic application of the full model of ethnic democracy to Israel and documentation, 
see Smooha 1990, 1997c, and 2000. 
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its uniqueness, however, Israel is considered a western democracy by the Jewish elite, 
including the Zionist left, as well as by mainstream Israeli social scientists and 
western scholars.19 In all these nation-states, including Israel, the majority determines 
the identity and culture of state institutions. Hence, it is assumed that Israel is 
democratic and Jewish as France is democratic and French. This widespread outlook 
will be examined below. 
 
Background 
The Jews lived in the Land of Israel till the year 70 AD and were then exiled from 
their homeland. As a result of the Jewish question in Europe, a Zionist movement 
emerged in the late nineteenth century, aiming to restore the Jewish homeland in the 
Land of Israel. Until 1948 600,000 immigrants arrived and built a new modern Jewish 
community. The right of Jews to the land and statehood were recognized in a series of 
Western and international resolutions. The Palestinians rejected Jewish settlement and 
rights and demanded from the British Mandate the immediate formation of a 
Palestinian state. In 1948 the State of Israel was proclaimed and a war with the Arab 
world erupted. During the war over half of the Palestinian people escaped or were 
deported and became refugees. At the end of the war Israel controlled 78 per cent of 
the land of Mandatory Palestine. 
Of the 900,000 Palestinians who lived in the area that became Israel, only 186,000 
Palestinian Arabs remained in the country. Israel extended automatic citizenship to 
the Arabs, but they were considered potentially disloyal and put under military 
government until 1966. About half of their land was confiscated. Israel absorbed 
millions of Jews since 1948 but refused to let the Arab refugees return. In the 
aftermath of the 1967 war Israel occupied the entire land of Mandatory Palestine, 
bringing Palestinian citizens and non-citizens together. By the mid-1970s Israeli 
Palestinians got organized and started an intense struggle for peace and equality. In 
1976, they conducted the first of many general strikes in protest of land confiscations, 
inadequate funding and other discriminatory practices. During the first Intifada (the 
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 Lijphart, for example, regards Israel as a western type of democracy (1993). In a comparative 
study of 24 democracies, he places Israel in an isolated location because it is found to be very high on 
certain consociational measures, such as the electoral method of proportional representation, while it is 
very low on others, such as the unitary, non-federal structure. He explains this classification by Israel’s 
internal deep divisions that necessitate consociationalism and by its small size that does not need 
federalism. Lijphart’s underlying assumption is that Israel is on the whole a western democracy. 
  50 
Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987-93) they protested in 
solidarity with their brethren. They protested again during the second Intifada 
(beginning in late September 2000) and 12 Arab citizens were killed in clashes with 
the police in the first week of October 2000. Most of the Arabs boycotted the 
elections to the prime minister (held on February 6, 2001) in protest of the 
maltreatment of Arab protesters by the police and government. 
 
Ethnic Ascendancy 
Israel declares and legislates itself as a Jewish and democratic state. It is the 
homeland of the entire Jewish people, of whom over 60 per cent live in the Diaspora. 
It sees its destiny and duty in preserving the Jewish people and regards the state of 
Israel as the main instument to carry out this ultimate goal. 
Zionism is the official state ideology and its central objective is to make Israel 
increasingly Jewish in demography, language, culture, institutions, identity and 
symbols, and to protect Jewish lives and interests all over the world. Zionism accepts 
the historical development of Jews as an ethnic nation, in which ethnicity, religion 
and peoplehood are intertwined. A member of the Jewish people cannot hold to a non-
Judaic religion. Israel was conceived and born Jewish. It sees itself as a direct 
successor of Jewish sovereignty that ended with the destruction of the Second Temple 
two thousand years ago. It confers a statutory status on Zionist organizations that 
represent and cater to Jews only. 
Israel keeps its Jewish identity through various measures. One important 
mechanism is the central role of religion. It is Orthodox Judaism that is entrusted with 
defining who is a Jew, blocking free admission of non-Jews into the Israeli Jewish 
population and preserving its ethnonational nature. Prevention of the formation of a 
new, multi-religious, multiethnic, Israeli civic nation is also achieved by the lack of 
civil marriage and divorce, a legal void that legitimizes and enforces national and 
religious endogamy. Membership in the Jewish nation is thus kept separate from 
Israeli citizenship. 
Another bulwark of Jewish ascendancy is the Law of Return which provides Jews 
free admission to and settlement in the country. Jewish newcomers and their Jewish 
and non-Jewish descendants are extended automatic citizenship, and ample assistance 
in the absorption and integration of immigrants is provided. Over two million Jews 
arrived and were absorbed in Israeli society since 1948. Jews are considered 
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“returnees,” not immigrants. The other dimension of the Law of Return is the denial 
of the right of repatriation to 3.5 million Palestinian refugees. The Law of Return is 
further complemented by the virtual non-practice of Israel’s laws of immigration and 
naturalization. Together, these three pillars of the immigration regime guarantee the 
preservation and augmentation of the Jewish majority. 
Hebrew is Israel’s official and dominant language while Arabic is official but non-
dominant. It is the solid base of the evolving Israeli Jewish culture and is dominant in 
all areas of life (home, mass media, economy, government, science, etc.). It is the 
only official language in compulsory education for Jews, displacing foreign languages 
and cultures in the Israeli-born generation. It is acquired and widely used by Jewish 
immigrants and Israeli Arabs. 
Over 90 per cent of the land in Israel is either owned or controlled by the state or 
Jewish public bodies. Jewish control of land makes it possible to establish new Jewish 
settlements for immigrant absorption and national security and to expand and develop 
existing Jewish communities all over the country. 
The state symbolic system is strictly Jewish. Israel’s official titular name, 
calendar, days and sites of commemoration, heroes, flag, emblem, national anthem, 
names of places and ceremonies are Jewish. 
The state also prefers Jews to Arabs in extending entitlements and benefits and in 
its policies of funding localities, regions, institutions and organizations. 
 
Perceived Threats 
In the Jews’ eyes, the creation, crafting and maintenance of Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state, rather than as a civic democracy, aim to contain three major threats 
to their nation and state. One is the menace to the continued survival of the Jewish 
Diaspora. Antisemitism, dilution of the Jewish identity and culture and mixed 
marriages are the main dangers. Israel defines its role as an agent who forestalls these 
dangers, fosters ties with the Diaspora, facilitates Jewish immigration, and thus 
normalizes the Jewish people. A Jewish state is regarded as a necessary condition for 
the Jewish national survival. It provides a safe shelter to persecuted Jews and to any 
Jew who seeks full and sovereign Jewish life. Preservation of the Jewish Diaspora is 
important for Israel as a reservoir of immigrants, political support, moral solidarity 
and economic help. 
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The second threat is the physical and political survival of Israel in the region. 
Despite the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, Israel sees itself rejected and 
resisted by Syria, Iraq, Iran and other Moslem states. Even if peace is achieved, the 
region will remain insecure, unfriendly and volatile. Located in a largely non-Jewish 
region, the Jewish state will have to keep a high military capability and national 
distinctiveness in order to survive as a separate state. Regional animosity is expected 
to continue because Israel prefers economic, political and cultural integration into the 
West rather than into the Middle East. Maintenance of Israel as a Jewish state stirs 
rejection in the region on the one hand, and is a cause for the mobilization of Israeli 
Jews on the other. 
The Palestinian citizens of Israel are the third threat in Jewish eyes. They 
constitute a security and demographic hazard. With regard to national security, the 
Arabs are an enemy-affiliated minority and an integral part of the Palestinian people 
and the multi-state Arab nation that are not friendly to Israel. They are also 
concentrated in border and confrontation areas with high pressure to collaborate with 
hostile elements. They live in territories that were earmarked to belong to a 
Palestinian state according to the 1947 UN partition resolution, and hence are 
suspected of harboring a deep-seated secessionist sentiment. Their numerous 
deprivations in the past and present cast further doubt on their loyalty to the state. 
There are several elements in the Israeli Arab demography that frighten the Jews. 
The Arabs make up 11 per cent of Israel’s electorate, making them a direct threat to 
the right-wing political bloc (over half of the Jewish voters) that does not receive from 
them its share of support. Hence they can decide crucial issues, most notably 
territorial withdrawals in exchange for peace agreements, that divide Jews in Israel. 
Since the Arab birthrate is double the Jewish one, the Arabs enjoy a disproportionate 
share of the state resources. They constitute a majority of 70 per cent in the central-
mountainous Galilee, a concentration that is feared to threaten the national security 
and the Jewish identity of the Northern region and to prompt them to demand 
territorial autonomy. 
 
Diminished Democracy 
Israel functions as a diminished democracy for the Arab minority. It extends them 
both individual and collective rights. The Arabs enjoy human, social, civil and 
political rights. They are recognized as a minority and accorded all the collective 
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rights that are essential for a separate existence: free use of the Arabic language 
(which is an official language), a separate school system in Arabic, Arabic media, 
Arabic cultural institutions, and separate religious institutions that ensure endogamy. 
All these institutional arrangements are at least partially funded by the state. The 
Arabs live in separate communities and are not pressured to assimilate. 
However, Arab rights are incomplete and not properly protected. Israel does not 
accept the Arabs as a national Palestinian minority. It does not recognize their 
national leadership, their right to cultural autonomy and their ties with the Palestinian 
people. Their right to property, for instance, is vulnerable in view of the massive land 
expropriations, the state’s reluctance to allocate land for Arab development, and the 
social and semi-legal restrictions on land acquisitions by Arabs outside Arab areas. 
Discrimination against the Arabs by the state and by the Jewish public is widespread 
in the funding of services, entitlements and hiring. 
On the other hand, the Arab right to representation, protest and struggle is highly 
respected by the state. The Arab participation rates in elections to the Knesset, local 
authorities and the Histadrut trade union is very high. They elect Arab representatives 
in proper proportion. For instance, 12 out of the 120 Knesset members in 2001 were 
Arabs, of whom 9 represented Arab parties. The Arab representation in the Knesset 
provides a political leverage in the divided Israeli politics. The Arabs extensively use 
demonstrations and partial and general strikes in protest for peace and equality. There 
is a large Arab civic society, consisting of political representative bodies, self-help 
and welfare organizations, and cultural associations. All these voluntary groups are 
engaged in the promotion of Arab interests and in protest both in Israel and abroad. 
The authorities do not ban these activities and do not use repressive measures against 
Arab dissidents. 
At the same time, the Arabs are regarded as potentially disloyal to the state and 
are placed under control. Looming largest among the diverse control measures is 
security surveillance. The Arabs are exempted from compulsory military service and 
excluded from the other security forces. Defined as a high risk, the Arab minority as a 
whole is an official target of the secret service that collects information, follows 
troublemakers and issues security alerts. The state operates in a permanent state of 
emergency with unlimited powers to suspend civil rights in order to detect and 
prevent security infractions. Israeli law does not allow a change of Israel’s Jewish-
Zionist character through parliamentary procedures. Israeli citizens, including the 
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Arabs, are precluded by law from establishing political parties and running for the 
Knesset on a platform that denies Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people; 
motions by Knesset members to tamper with Israel’s exclusive Jewish-Zionist identity 
and mission are similarly forbidden. Israel denies Arabs cultural autonomy lest they 
misuse it for instigating against the state, building an independent power base, 
conducting illegal struggle and forming a secessionist movement. Since 1948 the state 
has successfully executed a large-scale Jewish settlement of Arab areas in order to de-
territorialize the Arabs. It has also made attempts to encourage internal Arab divisions 
in order to weaken national Arab unity and to prevent a concerted mass support for 
the PLO and the Palestinian people. All these steps for containing the Arab minority 
are taken in defense of national security and the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state. 
The diminished and self-contradictory nature of Israeli democracy and Arab status 
is evident in Arab politics. The Arab parties, enjoying about 70 per cent of the Arab 
vote, are part of the Labor political bloc. Without the Arab vote and without the 
support of the Arab parties, the Labor-Meretz government of 1992-1996 could not 
have been formed and the Oslo peace process would not have been possible. One of 
the right-wing slogans in the 1996 election campaign was “Natanyahu is good for the 
Jews.” The Likud and radical right opposition parties and movements delegitimized 
the Rabin government and peacemaking for being dependent on Arab support and 
devoid of “a Jewish political majority.” In 2000 the Likud introduced a Knesset bill 
requiring a special majority in future national referendums on Israel’s permanent 
borders. The manifest intention is to neutralize the Arab vote. These delegitimacy 
moves are censured by the left and Labor as “racist.” Labor-Left governments exploit 
the backing of Arab parties from the outside, excluding them from the government 
coalition and denying them cabinet posts, power-sharing and many other resources 
commonly allocated to coalition partners. Yet the Rabin government of 1992-1995 
made significant concessions to the Arab minority (e.g., abolished the well-
established discrimination in family allowances). 
It is also worth noting that the formal legal ban of parliamentary actions against 
Israel’s character is actually not enforced. Arab parties that reject Israel’s Jewish-
Zionist identity are formed, run in Knesset elections and introduce bills for 
restructuring the Jewish makeup of the state. The Jewish establishment tolerates Arab 
dissidence because it is united and resolute on the Jewish nature of the state and 
because of the calculation that underground Arab dissidence is more dangerous and 
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damaging. This contradiction in the Arab political status recurs even more strikingly 
in the peculiar situation where the Arabs are allowed to keep separate communities 
and institutions but are deprived of institutional autonomy (e.g., they have separate 
schools in Arabic but do not control them). 
The non-civic character of Israel’s regime is quite transparent. Ethnic nationalism 
reinforces the ethnic nature of democracy. Jewish nationality is grounded on ethnic 
descent and religion, neither on residence in a common territory nor on a shared 
citizenship. National identity takes precedence over citizenship among both Arabs and 
Jews. There has been no development in Israel of an Israeli nation or an Israeli people 
and the national movements of both sides negate the formation of such new 
overarching entities.20 
Israel is a diminished ethnic democracy and not a liberal democracy because the 
state recognizes ethnic groups, and not just individuals. It is neither a liberal nor a 
multicultural democracy because it makes the Jews a core ethnic nation and the Arabs 
non-core outsiders. It imposes separation between Arabs and Jews through the law of 
religious marriages, making intermarriages infrequent and illegitimate (but 
recognizable by law). Israel lacks a national identity of its own that is shared by all of 
its citizens, and instead of treating all citizens equally, it privileges the Jews. The state 
is explicitly partial, serving as the homeland of all Jews in the world, not impartially 
catering to all its citizens regardless of ethnic origin. 
Israel is an ethnic democracy and not a consociational democracy because the 
state is neither binational nor neutral in the dispute between minority and majority but 
is rather identified with the Jewish majority that employs it as a vehicle to further its 
particular interests. The Arab minority is not considered as an equal partner in the 
society and the state. It is suspected of disloyalty and placed under control, not 
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 The ethnic nature of Israeli democracy is also evident in the criteria of good citizenship and in 
the basic inequality between Arabs and Jews to meet them. A good citizen contributes to the state much 
beyond law obedience, tax payment, military service, voting in elections and regular involvement in 
public life that are expected of a rank and file citizen. With the crucial exception of army duty, there is 
no difference between Arabs and Jews in becoming rank and file citizens. On the other hand, a good 
citizen in Israel is expected not only to excel in voluntary activities but also to make contributions to 
the achievement of state goals, which are the strengthening of national security, increase of the Jewish 
majority, cultivation of the Hebrew language, ingathering of (Jewish) exiles, settlement of the land 
(with Jews), dispersion of the (Jewish) population all over the country and economic independence. 
This “common good” was and is determined by Jews only and Arabs are barred from influencing it. 
The prospects that an Arab will become a good citizen are low indeed because being an Arab, bearing 
Arab children and practicing Arabic language and culture, an Arab cannot contribute, whatever efforts 
made, to most of these state Jewish objectives. 
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recognized as a national Palestinian minority, denied a proportional share of the 
national resources, lacking territorial or institutional autonomy and devoid of a veto 
power. There is no need to conduct tough negotiations with the Arabs in order to 
reach compromises and agreements over disputed issues. 
Israel is not a common western nation-state. As an ethnic democracy, it is not 
Jewish and democratic in the same way as France, being a republican-liberal 
democracy, is French and democratic, and not in the same way as Belgium, being a 
consociational democracy, is Belgian and democratic. It is paradoxical, however, that 
the Jews strongly believe that Israeli democracy is western and liberal, and that there 
is no contradiction in Israel between being Jewish and democratic. It is even more 
paradoxical that Israel is universally accepted in the West as a Western liberal 
democracy. Its character as Jewish and democratic is sanctioned by the West and was 
legitimized by the 1947 United Nations partition resolution, providing for the 
formation of two states in Palestine – one Jewish and one Arab. In other words, there 
is international legitimacy for the existence of an ethnic democracy in Israel. 
Israel’s Supreme Court articulated, in several rulings, the Jewish-democratic credo 
on Israeli democracy. It reaffirmed the constitutionality of the requirement that in 
order to participate in Knesset elections any list must not deny Israel as the homeland 
of the Jewish people. In this regard it ruled that “there is no contradiction whatsoever 
between these two things: The state is the state of the Jews, while its regime is an 
enlightened democratic regime that accords rights to all citizens, Jews and non-Jews” 
(Supreme Court, 1989, paragraph 8). The counter-claim that there is an inbuilt 
contradiction between the democratic and Jewish nature of the state was rejected: 
“There is no real contradiction, so to speak, between the different clauses of 
paragraph 7a: the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people does 
not negate its democratic character, as the Frenchness of France does not negate its 
democratic character” (Supreme Court, 1988, p. 189). At the same time the Supreme 
Court announced the constitutionality of the principle of equality and issued some 
rulings, since mid-1985, that are liberal in nature and in favor of the Arabs. To 
mention just a few, the court refrained from disqualifying Arab parties despite their 
alleged rejection of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, supported the 
mandatory use of Arabic in official signs, ruled against the state practice to allocate 
land for founding purely Jewish communities, and declared certain state funding 
policies as discriminatory and void. 
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The Jewish consensus on the liberal and enlightened nature of Israeli democracy 
and the inability to see the difference between Israel and western countries are a 
genuine conviction, not a make-believe. Israel is considered as a Western liberal 
democracy because it meets the fundamental requirement of extending individual 
(human, social, civil and political) rights for all, while the existence of the principle of 
Jewish ascendancy is deemed irrelevant. The true belief in the full legitimacy and 
quality of the Israeli democracy makes the Jews united, determined and intransigent 
on holding to ethnic democracy. Furthermore, the provision of individual and certain 
group rights to the Arab minority creates ambiguity and flexibility in the nature of the 
system, contributing to its stability. 
These ideas about the liberal nature of Israeli democracy are shared by Israeli and 
western mainstream social scientists. For instance, Neuberger (1998) regards Israel as 
a liberal “democracy with stains.” It deviates from liberal democracy in a lack of 
constitution, a permanent state of emergency, an indirect legal inequality between 
men and women through the religious jurisdiction over personal status, the statutory 
status of the Zionist organizations, the Law of Return and related deviations. These 
shortcomings do not disqualify Israel as a liberal democracy, however, because they 
are not debilitating and because there is no such thing as a perfect liberal democracy. 
Neuberger (1999) rejects the model of ethnic democracy in principle and its 
application to Israel in particular. Dowty (1999) follows suit. He sees all liberal-
democratic nation-states as ethnic in one way or another and Israel as generally more 
ethnic and problematic on the continuum. Avineri (1998) claims that Israel better fits 
the type of multicultural democracy than western countries like France with regard to 
cultural, religious and national minorities. Israel recognizes the Arabs as a linguistic, 
cultural and religious minority and extends to them wide collective rights, while 
liberal-republican and Jacobin France imposes a uniform linguistic-cultural model on 
the entire population. Don-Yehiya and Susser (1999) do not share Avineri’s analysis. 
Rather, they see Israel as an exception among western democracies in not having 
developed toward multicultural democracy since 1945. They attribute the persistence 
of Jewish ethnonationalism to the centrality of religion for Jewish national survival 
and to the centuries-old, ethno-religious Jewish nation that pre-dates the modern state 
of Israel. Notwithstanding these well-taken insights, Don-Yehiya and Susser 
categorize Israel as a liberal democracy. 
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These characteristics which are viewed by mainstream social scientists like 
Neuberger as readily rectifiable aberrations, are regarded by radical social scientists as 
substantive traits that make Israel a non-democracy. For Yiftachel (1997), Rouhana 
(1998), Ghanem (1998), Ghanem, Rouhana and Yiftachel (1999) and Kimmerling 
(1999), among others, Israel is an “ethnic state” or an “ethnocracy,” a state with some 
democratic features but clearly short of being a democracy. While refraining from the 
term Herrenvolk democracy, they advance the view of Israel as a settler-frontier 
society without fixed borders, an occupier of Palestinian territories, an exclusionary 
and discriminatory state vis-à-vis its Arab citizens, a society leaning toward 
theocracy, militarism, and the like. The formation of the Palestinian Authority, the 
historical process of peacemaking and the ongoing democratization of the state do not 
alter this situation radically, leaving Israel as a non-democracy. 
Both the mainstream and radical approaches err in disregarding the inherent 
contradiction built into Israel’s dual character. Israel is a solid ethnic democracy that 
possesses not only the features but also most of the conditions that give rise to and 
sustain ethnic democracy. They include a large and stable Jewish majority, a strong 
commitment to democracy for all, self-definition of the Jews as a homeland ethnic 
nation (a returning Diaspora rather than immigrants and settlers) with an inalienable 
right to the land, and the existence of a big Diaspora with support and need of Israel. 
No less important is the Jews’ pervasive sense of continued serious threats to the 
survival of the Jewish people and Israel that only a Jewish and democratic state can 
forestall. This set of circumstances is firm enough to shore up an ethnic democracy in 
Israel. 
 
Factors Conducive to Emergence 
What are the factors accounting for the emergence of ethnic democracy in Israel? The 
Jewish nature of the state is not a natural outgrowth of the unintentional, centuries-
old, normal process of living on the land as a Jewish majority, but rather a result of 
the Zionist project of the twentieth century to design a state on such a basis, to craft it 
according to a blueprint of ethnic-Jewish arrangements and institutions, and to follow 
an explicit policy of arresting the possible development of democracy along civic – 
liberal, multicultural, or consociational – lines. 
Zionism emerged in Eastern Europe as a brand of ethnic nationalism, accepting 
the Jews as an ethnic nation. The Zionist project has always aimed to resolve the 
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Jewish question and to mold a state that serves as the exclusive homeland and 
protector of the Jewish people. The Jewish state has been conceived as a primary tool 
for containing real and imagined threats to the security, welfare and national identity 
of the Jews in the Diaspora and the Land of Israel. The continued Jewish-Arab 
conflict before and after the establishment of the Jewish state necessitates the mass 
mobilization of the Jews, and the idea of an ethnic Jewish state has served as an 
effective means of mobilization. 
While it is clear why under these circumstances the state created by the Jews 
could not be designed to be a civic state but rather an ethnic state, it remains to be 
explained why it became democratic. Two factors can account for democracy. One is 
the commitment of Zionism and the Jewish founders of the state to democracy. 
Zionism has a strong orientation to the West and the idea of democracy has always 
been central in its grand design. Democracy is an admission card into the West and an 
expedient for receiving ample and essential support from the West. It has also been a 
vital mode of conflict-management between rival Jewish groups. Adherence to 
democratic procedures rests, therefore, on strong ideological and pragmatic 
considerations. 
The other explanatory factor is affordability. It was feasible to establish 
democracy in Israel and to extend it to the Arabs because they constituted a small and 
manageable minority as a result of the mass exodus of the Palestinians during the 
1948 war. Without the massive removals of the Palestinians, the Arab minority would 
have probably been disenfranchised. This speculation can be substantiated by the fact 
that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 has not led to full 
annexation, with an automatic extension of citizenship to the Palestinians, as Israel 
did after 1948. The size of the Palestinian population has acted since 1967 as the real 
obstacle and it still is the most important reason for Israel’s readiness to withdraw 
from most of the Palestinian territories and to allow the formation of a separate 
Palestinian state. The Zionist idea of a Jewish and democratic state, namely, ethnic 
democracy, is the primary consideration in including the small Arab minority into 
Israeli democracy and in excluding the larger Palestinian population. 
 
Conditions of Stability 
Israel can continue to be a Jewish and democratic state for the foreseeable future if 
it meets several conditions. First is the need to keep Jews as a permanent majority in 
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Israel. Jews will remain a solid majority if Diaspora Jews continue to immigrate to 
Israel, if non-Jews will be kept out, if Israel will withdraw from the West Bank and 
Gaza, and if it will continue to deny the right of return to Arab refugees. There is a 
consensus on this issue within the Jewish majority. 
The second condition is a continued sense of threat to the survival of the Jewish 
ethnic nation in Israel and abroad. Without a continued perceived threat and a sense of 
insecurity, Jews will not feel the need to keep Israel Jewish as a defense system. 
The third condition is the continued inability and unwillingness of the Arab world 
and the Palestinian people to intervene on behalf of the Arab minority in Israel. If 
these ethnic patrons are capable and willing to mobilize Israeli Arabs in order to 
destabilize Israel, Israel may withhold democracy from its Arab citizens in order to 
weather the foreign intervention. This condition will not be met as long as Israel 
remains strong. It is also unlikely that the PLO or Palestinian leaders will pursue this 
course of action because it is in their interest to have a Palestinian minority in Israel 
that can act as a strong lobby for Palestinian causes. 
The fourth condition is lack of intervention by the international community on 
behalf of the Arab minority and for changing Israel’s character. This condition is 
satisfied. Israel’s right to be Jewish and democratic is fully legitimated in the 1947 
UN resolution for the formation of Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. It has never 
been challenged by any international resolution. The more recent criticisms of Israel 
by UN committees and other international organizations on human and minority 
rights for maltreating Arabs in Israel are limited in scope and have never questioned 
the legitimacy of the Jewish state and its democracy. 
The ethnic configuration of Israeli democracy is so deeply ingrained that a shift to 
a civic type is not likely for the foreseeable future. The Jews take ethnic democracy 
for granted and see it as unproblematic. They regard a Jewish and democratic state as 
their absolute and legitimate right, think that Jews can fulfill their national aspirations 
only in a Jewish state, and feel that their life in Israel would become meaningless if 
Israel ceased to be Jewish. The vocal “post-Zionist” circle, advocating a liberal, 
multicultural or a consociational democracy, is mostly confined to a handful of Jewish 
intellectuals and unlikely to become the mainstream in the foreseeable future. A 
radical transformation of Israel is most genuinely and popularly desired by the Arabs 
but they do not have the power to affect such a sea change. 
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The stability of Israeli ethnic democracy also stems from its flexibility and 
adaptability. It has truly improved over the years, as reflected in the shift in the Arab 
status. Israel has undergone a process of democratization and has substantially eroded 
the control over Arabs. Until 1966 and to a large extent even through 1975, the Arabs 
were placed under strict administrative control, subject to massive land expropriations 
and extensive discrimination, and passively resigned to their fate as a subordinate 
minority. Since 1976 they have been engaged in a continuous struggle for equal rights 
and opportunities and for peace, for publicly expressing their Palestinian identity and 
attachment, organizing in independent and nationalist parties, seeking autonomy, and 
even calling for remaking Israel into “a state of all of its citizens,” a slogan that 
challenges Israel’s Jewish-Zionist character. 
This change amounts to a historical shift from a hardline to a standard subtype of 
ethnic democracy. It shows that Israel’s ethnic democracy is flexible enough to 
absorb, in the future, various concessions to the Arabs, including admission into 
coalition politics, extension of cultural autonomy and recognition of the Arabs as a 
Palestinian national minority. These and other consociational ingredients can be 
integrated into Israel’s ethnic democracy without transforming its essence, namely, 
institutionalized Jewish dominance, state preferential treatment of Jews, preservation 
of a Jewish majority, state Jewish symbols and a firm commitment to and ties with the 
Jewish Diaspora.21 
Survey data, collected during the period from 1976 to 1995, demonstrate the 
disagreement between Jews and Arabs on ethnic democracy and the trends of change 
in their attitudes on this fundamental issue.22 They show that the Jews are firmly 
committed to Israel as an ethnic democracy and that their commitment has not waned 
over the years. An overwhelming majority of 86.2 per cent in 1988 and 90.5 per cent 
in 1995 defined themselves as Zionist. As many as 97.7 per cent in 1980 and 96.4 per 
cent in 1995 thought that the state should keep its Jewish majority. The internal 
differences on this matter were insignificant. According to the 1995 survey, the 
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 For the contrary view that the introduction of such consociational elements would transform 
Israel from an ethnic to a consociational democracy, see Peled 1993. 
22
 Five surveys were conducted in the years 1976, 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1995. Each was based on 
a national representative sample of 1,200 Arab and 1,200 Jewish Israelis aged 18 and older and living 
in Israel within the pre-1967 borders (excluding East Jerusalem). Data were collected by standard 
questionnaires in face-to-face interviews. Sampling error is 3.5 per cent. Surveys are comparable due to 
a common design and core questions. The 1985 and 1988 surveys are reported in full in Smooha 1992 
and the 1995 survey in Smooha 1997a. 
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proportions supporting a policy of Jewish majority for Israel were 95.5 per cent 
among the most cosmopolitan Jews,23 92.9 per cent among voters for the left, 99.3 per 
cent among voters for the right and 100.0 per cent among the ultra-Orthodox although 
they are known to be aloof to Zionism. The proportion of Jews who definitely oppose 
and would not even consider the adaptation of the Israeli flag in order to have Israeli 
Arabs identify with it was 91.1 per cent in 1980 and 86.7 per cent in 1995. 
Other findings reveal that Jews associate the ethnic nature of the state with many 
other characteristics that would be regarded as racist in western civic democracies. 
For instance, in 1995 59.9 per cent agreed that on questions involving territorial 
withdrawals that determine Israel’s permanent borders there should be a Jewish 
political majority and Arab votes should not be considered; 36.7 per cent were in 
favor of and 35.0 per cent were reserved about (but not opposed to) the idea that the 
state should seek and use any opportunity to encourage Israeli Arab citizens to leave 
the country; 59.2 per cent maintained that only Jews should be employed in the civil 
service or at least should be given preferential treatment in employment in this state 
sector; and 85.9 per cent oppose the appointment of an Arab as the state’s president. 
In contrast, Arab citizens show a clear trend of accommodation. To cite some of 
the highlights, the proportion denying Israel’s right to exist was as low as 20.5 per 
cent in 1976, dropping to 6.8 per cent in 1995. Arabs defining themselves in non-
Israeli Palestinian terms constituted 32.9 per cent in 1976, down to 10.3 per cent in 
1995. Moreover, the proportion of Arabs rejecting Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish-
Zionist state (i.e., as an ethnic democracy) declined from 57.1 per cent in 1980 to 35.3 
per cent in 1995, and the proportion of Arabs defining themselves as anti-Zionist 
diminished from 47.1 per cent in 1988 to 24.7 per cent in 1995. These figures unravel 
the growing realization among Israeli Arabs that the forthcoming solution to the 
Palestinian question obliges them to resign themselves to a minority status, that they 
are unable to do away with Israel’s Jewish-Zionist character and that their struggle 
should be conducted according to the law and focus on obtaining greater equality. 
Questions were posed in the 1995 survey about the acceptability of each option 
for reshaping Arab-Jewish relations. Of the Jews, as many as 31.4 per cent agreed to a 
population transfer of Israeli Arab citizens, 26.5 per cent to a Herrenvolk democracy, 
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 Jews who are Israeli-born, Ashkenazi (European), aged 18-45, having post-secondary education, 
secular and supporting the left parties (Labor and Meretz). 
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and as few as 4.5 per cent to a liberal democracy. It is confirmed by previous surveys 
that very few Jews consent to a binational state (consociational democracy). Of the 
Arabs, 31.6 per cent agreed to an Islamic state in Greater Palestine instead of Israel, 
37.8 per cent to a secular-democratic state in Greater Palestine to replace Israel, 81.5 
per cent to a consociational democracy, 40.5 per cent to an individual-liberal 
democracy, and 24.4 per cent to an individual-liberal democracy with the possibility 
of a significant rate of intermarriage. Beyond these sharp Jewish-Arab discords, 
however, there were concurring majorities of 71.5 per cent of the Jews and 65.9 per 
cent of the Arabs on what can be called “an improved ethnic democracy”: “Israel will 
continue to be a Jewish-Zionist state and the Arabs will enjoy democratic rights, get 
their proportional share of the budgets and manage their religious, educational and 
cultural institutions.” 
This picture of Arab-Jewish relations has been, however, undergoing a significant 
change since 1996 (after the 1995 surveys were taken). All Israeli governments since 
Rabin’s assassination in November 1995 were particularly bad for the Arab minority 
in their double retreat from the peacemaking with the Palestinians and from the 
benevolent Rabin policies toward Israeli Arabs. In 1996 two radical Arab groups 
joined Israeli parliamentary politics – a faction of the fundamentalist Islamic 
Movement and a nationalist Palestinian movement known as Balad. They launched 
heavy attacks against the status quo of discrimination and exclusion of Arabs and 
blamed the nature of the regime for the Arab predicament. This combination of a shift 
to the worse in the government’s foreign and domestic policies and the entry of new 
radical forces into Arab politics redirected the Arab political discourse toward greater 
rejection of the status quo, militancy and radicalism. The change was well captured by 
the two Arab public opinion surveys taken in 1999 and 2001. For instance, the 
historical decrease in the proportion of Arabs denying Israel’s right to exist, dropping 
from 20.5 per cent in 1976 to 6.8 per cent in 1995, was reversed, rising to 15.6 per 
cent in 2001. 
The outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada also engulfed Israeli Arabs. Their protest 
in solidarity with the Intifada encountered harsh police brutality, resulting in 12 Arab 
casualties and hundreds wounded during the first week of October 2000. In Arab 
eyes, the state treated them as non-citizens, while in Jewish eyes, Arabs behaved as 
non-citizens by siding unequivocally with the enemy. The Arab anger at the Labor 
government led to two unprecedented democratic moves – the appointment of a state 
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inquiry commission to investigate the October events and the Arab boycott of the 
elections to the prime minister held in February 2001. These intricate developments 
divulge the complex interplay of democratic and non-democratic forces in Israel’s 
ethnic democracy. 
 
B. Slovakia24 
Background 
The Slovaks have lived in the present area of Slovakia for centuries but for over 
more than one thousand years they were under an imperial Hungarian rule. Slovak 
nationalism rose only during the 1860s and demanded autonomy within, rather than 
independence from, the Hungarian empire. During the first decade of the twentieth 
century Hungary practiced a firm assimilationist policy, closing Slovak schools and 
cultural associations. In 1918, following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, 
the new state of Czechoslovakia came into being. The Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 
officially sealed the loss of two-thirds of Hungary’s territory and one-third of its 
population to neighboring countries, resulting in a near abroad Hungarian Diaspora 
totaling 5 million in 2001. 
One of the new Hungarian minorities lived in Southern Slovakia and enjoyed 
collective rights like other minorities in Czechoslovakia. In 1938 Nazi Germany 
occupied Czechoslovakia, annexed the Czech part, ceded Southern Slovakia to 
Hungary and declared Slovakia as an independent (Nazi puppet) state. The resistance 
movement against the pro-Nazi government of Slovakia considered the Hungarians as 
collaborators with the enemy (Hungary and Germany). After the war the new 
government in Slovakia adopted the doctrine of “collective guilt” (Benes Decrees) of 
the Hungarians and the Sudeten Germans and took harsh measures, including 
expulsion, ethnic cleansing, disenfranchisement, confiscation of property, and a ban 
on the public use of the Hungarian language, against them. While the removal of the 
Germans was approved by the Allies, the expulsion of the Hungarians was allowed 
only partially because their collaboration with the Nazis was considered to be less 
serious. A population exchange between Hungary and Czechoslovakia took place that 
decreased the size of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. 
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 For an application of the mini-model of ethnic democracy to Slovakia, see Van Duin and 
Polackova 2000. This section draws on many sources, including Bekker 1997; Gyurcsik and 
Satterwhite 1996; Hungary 1998; Kusy 1997; and Daftary and Gál 2000. 
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The communist takeover of Slovakia in 1948 stabilized the situation and stopped 
the persecution of Hungarians who stayed and allowed some to return. By 1968 the 
rights of the Hungarian minority were restored in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarians in 
Slovakia, like their kinfolk in Hungary, supported the Velvet Revolution. During the 
post-Communist transition period from 1989 to 1992 the rights of the Hungarians as a 
minority were respected. The breakup of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993 was a 
turning point in the status of the Hungarian minority which did not welcome it. Its 
size in the new state of Slovakia was doubled, reaching 11 per cent of the total 
population. Until 1998 the state was ruled by Prime Minister Meciar who pursued a 
policy of reducing the minority rights of the Hungarians. In 1998 a new government 
came to power. It coopted the Hungarian Coalition Party as a member of the 
government coalition. 
After its independence in 1993, Slovakia applied to the European Union and 
NATO for membership. It joined the Council of Europe in 1993, the OSCE in 1993, 
and the OECD in 2000. These international bodies and other NGOs monitor 
democracy and minority rights in Slovakia. 
 
Ethnic Ascendancy 
Slovak nationalism is grounded in ethnicity and language. It assumes the existence 
of a mythical Slovak ethnic nation in the area for the last 800 years. It deplores the 
subordination of the Slovak nation to the Magyars for centuries and to the Czechs to a 
large degree during the period from 1918 to 92. Independence since 1993 is the first 
historical opportunity to assert the Slovak ethnic nation and to build an independent 
state that is modeled after it. Slovak nationalism is clearly insecure, reactive, 
suspicious, revengeful, and devoid of liberal-democratic roots. It is preoccupied with 
feelings of inferiority and inadequacy toward both Hungarians and Czechs who were 
historically dominant and successful. Slovak post-independence nationalism aims to 
build a strong Slovak nation-state. Its stands on a civic type of democracy, a market 
economy and accession to the European Union and NATO are reserved and 
ambiguous. 
State-building and nation-building in Slovakia are designed to install ethnic 
Slovaks as the sole nation and to prevent any sign of binationalism. This objective is 
made clear in the preamble of the Slovak constitution which begins with the following 
words: “We, the Slovak nation, bearing in mind the political and cultural heritage of 
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our predecessors, the experience gained through centuries of struggle for our national 
existence and statehood…” It is the Slovak ethnic nation, not Slovak citizens, who are 
the new state-forming people of Slovakia. Explicit conflict-laden reference is also 
made in the constitution to the Slovaks’ “historical legacy of Great Moravia”. Ethnic 
Slovaks’ adoption of Moravian heritage as part of Slovak history and culture drives an 
edge between them and ethnic Hungarians because of the protracted existential 
conflict between Moravians and Hungarians. According to the preamble of the 
constitution, both ethnic Slovaks and other citizens ought to develop Slovakia as an 
ethnic nation-state for the benefit of ethnic Slovaks. 
Slovakia is obviously avoiding any step that may be seen as making the 
Hungarian minority a co-nation and Slovakia a binational state. The state is plainly 
regarded by ethnic Slovaks as a tool to express their nationalism and to advance their 
interests while the Hungarians feel as second-class citizens. Slovaks’ ethnic 
ascendancy is transparent in language and state symbols. Slovak is the only state 
language and all state symbols (the flag, anthem, state seal, heroes, national 
monuments, calendar, and the like) are strictly Slovak. According to a liberal 1999 
law, minority languages are recognized for use in official contacts only in localities 
where a linguistic minority totals over 20 per cent of the local population and when 
the Minister of Interior certifies that this is the case. The minority has a right to 
separate schools in its own language but the protection of minority languages in other 
public spheres (courts, names of places, economy, etc.) is neither clear nor binding. 
The Slovak language is protected everywhere while the Hungarian language is not. 
The Hungarians are not accorded autonomy – be it territorial, national, 
educational, or cultural. The policy of the Meciar Government was to reduce 
Hungarian minority rights. The borders of the administrative districts were redrawn in 
a way that turned Hungarians into minorities in all districts despite their concentration 
in the south. Hungarians are not allowed to establish a state-funded Hungarian-
speaking university.25 Privatization under Meciar proceeded in a clientalist way, 
indirectly hurting the Hungarians who were excluded from the network of the 
nationalist regime and hence they are clearly underrepresented in the new capitalist 
class. Hungarians received their share of the land as farmers, but Hungarian 
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 Instead of a separate Hungarian university, Hungarians are offered a Hungarian-speaking 
faculty in the Slovak University of Nitra. The main goal of this move is to train teachers for Hungarian 
schools. Many Hungarians from Slovakia pursue university education in Hungary. 
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communities are deprived of land allocation for development and generation of 
revenues. The government denies the Hungarian demand to grant unclaimed lands to 
nearby municipalities because most of the beneficiaries would be Hungarian 
communities. State policies discriminate against the Hungarian minority in the 
funding of services and in appointments. 
 
Perceived Threats 
The Slovak state and the Slovak ethnic majority identify two major threats posed 
by the Hungarian minority. The first and foremost danger is to Slovakia’s territorial 
integrity. The Hungarian minority is defined as a potential fifth column. They are 
concentrated in the south, bordering with Hungary. For centuries the region was 
populated by Hungarians and considered Hungarian. It was ceded to Slovakia in 1918, 
returned again to Hungary in 1938 and re-ceded to Slovakia in 1945. The region is the 
most fertile land in the country and a national security asset. Slovakia feels insecure 
about the region, is especially fearful of irredentism by both Hungary and the 
Hungarian minority. Hungarian leaders from Slovakia maintain continuing ties with 
the Hungarian government, which has a separate ministry to deal with near abroad 
and Diaspora Hungarians. The contacts with the external homeland and patron cast 
doubts, in the minds of ethnic Slovaks, on the loyalty of the Hungarian minority. The 
questioning of Hungarian loyalty is further reinforced by Hungary’s Status Law 
enacted in 2001 which grants ethnic Hungarians near abroad privileges of entry, 
residence, employment, education and other benefits in Hungary. Although it is not 
officially and actually irredentist, Hungary’s active and partly interventionist Diaspora 
(near abroad) policy is seen as a threat by the insecure and suspicious Slovaks. 
The other and related threat is posed by the Hungarian minority to the uninational, 
unilingual and unicultural character of the state. Hungarians are by and large a 
dissident minority. Hungarian parties did not support the breakup of Czechoslovakia 
and did not vote for the constitution, the 1995 and 1999 language laws and the laws 
on reform of public administration (but they did vote for the constitutional reform of 
2001). Whether they admit it or not, the ultimate goal of the Hungarians and 
Hungarian parties is to make Slovakia a binational and a bilingual state and to 
establish a full-fledged consociational democracy in which they will enjoy power-
sharing, autonomy, proportional share of resources, veto power and politics of 
negotiation and compromise. As an indigenous and non-assimilating minority, living 
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in part of their historical homeland, ethnic Hungarians see these demands as 
legitimate and receive the backing of Hungary. On the other hand, in the eyes of 
ethnic Slovaks, Hungarian claims are subversive in nature. It is widely feared that the 
fully politically mobilized and represented Hungarians will misuse their strategic 
power in the fractured Slovak politics to transform the identity of the state. 
Slovakia employs several mechanisms to avert these threats. It does not allow 
transnational cooperation to prevent solidarity between Hungarians across the border. 
In order to contain Hungary’s potential aggression and intervention, Slovakia reached 
an agreement with Hungary on permanent borders, security, cooperation and minority 
rights. It denies the Hungarians autonomy and a separate nation-forming university. It 
practices a large-scale policy of deterritorialization of Hungarians by redistricting, 
turning them into weak and outvoted minorities in local and regional governments. It 
refuses to amend the preamble of the Constitution and other basic laws. Slovak 
nationalists also use delegitimacy tactics, arguing that ethnic Hungarians should see 
themselves primarily as Slovak, be loyal to Slovakia and sever their ties with 
Hungary. They also argue that the untrustworthy Hungarian parties should be 
excluded from government coalitions because of their alleged conflict of interests and 
potential disloyalty, and that laws and policies should be based on an ethnic Slovak 
political majority. 
 
Diminished Democracy 
The political system in Slovakia is a diminished democracy. It satisfies the 
procedural minimum definition. The state has a democratic constitution and 
institutions. All permanent residents are extended citizenship, free and fair elections 
are held, there is change of governments, the press is free, and the like. The 
Hungarian minority is highly mobilized and uses many political parties, voluntary 
associations and international bodies in a continued struggle for change. The struggle 
improves the status of the Hungarian minority and does not face state repression. Yet, 
democracy is young and fragile. The support for democracy is superficial and 
pragmatic, intending mostly to satisfy the precondition for admission into the 
European Union. The Slovak political elite is split on support of democracy, with a 
qualified backing by the populist-nationalist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS, led by Meciar) and the radical right-wing Slovak National Party (SNS). 
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Ethnic nation-building, clientalism, political corruption and personal and partisan 
gains often take precedence to due process and universal norms. 
The limited quality of Slovak democracy is evident in its dependence on the 
government in power. During the Meciar formative era, rule of law was broken quite 
often by governmental bodies, to the extent that Slovakia was not included in the first 
round of accession to the EU and reports of monitoring agencies were highly critical. 
Under the Dzurinda government, since 1998, democracy has improved and the 2001 
constitutional reform promises to strengthen it much further. Among other measures, the 
reform provides for greater powers and independence to the Constitutional Court and the 
state controller, establishes the office of ombudsman and lays the foundation for the 
decentralization of the public administration. In 2001, the new government signed the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Slovakia also has made 
significant headway in meeting other political and economic requirements for joining the 
EU, such as implementing a plan to fight political corruption. Democratization benefits 
particularly ethnic minorities because their rights are usually less protected. 
 
Factors Conducive for Emergence 
What factors can account for the emergence of ethnic democracy, rather than a 
civic type of democracy, in Slovakia? The Slovak ethnic nation pre-dated and created 
the Slovak state and hence the nation easily took over the state. A Slovak ethnic 
nation has been in the making during the twentieth century. The Slovak nation was 
under a Magyar and Czech tutelage and developed in contradistinction and opposition 
to them. The Slovak elite crafted the new state in the image of the ethnic nation. 
Ethnic Slovaks expect the new state to fulfill their submerged national feelings, rights 
and interests. 
Another important factor conducive to the emergence of ethnic democracy in 
Slovakia is the widespread sense of bitterness and threat generated by the Hungarian 
minority. The Hungarian minority is seen as part of the historical repressing power 
and is accused of playing an active disloyal role during World War Two. Its 
concentration in a sensitive border region and strong ties with a potentially irredentist 
state called for a policy of containment and exclusion. The Hungarian actual drive for 
autonomy (although Hungarian political parties have been careful not to present 
autonomy as an official demand) was perceived as a threat to the very territorial 
integrity and ethnonational homogeneity of Slovakia. 
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While these factors explain the grounding of ethnic ascendancy in the Slovak 
regime, two other factors account for democracy. These are the relatively small size 
of the minority (11 per cent) that allows to have democracy without renouncing ethnic 
ascendancy and the vital need to maintain democracy, or at least a semblance of it, in 
order to comply with international and EU standards. Ethnic democracy is the most 
appropriate option for this configuration of circumstances. 
 
Conditions of Stability 
The main conditions for the perpetuation and stability of ethnic democracy in 
Slovakia are continued ethnic Slovak majority, non-intervention of Hungary on behalf 
of the Hungarian minority and the uninterrupted, tacit acceptance of ethnic democracy 
by the EU. The persistence of these conditions seems probable and hence ethnic 
democracy looks secure. 
On the other hand, there are many likely developments that may turn ethnic 
democracy superfluous for Slovakia and will slowly transform it into multicultural 
democracy. Some observers interpret the recent change under the Dzurinda 
government as a shift in this direction. The transformation of the political regime 
depends on a substantial reduction in the level of mistrust and fear that ethnic Slovaks 
feel toward the Hungarian minority. The admission of Slovakia into the EU will 
liberalize the outlooks of ethnic Slovaks and dissipate their fear of potential 
Hungarian irredentism. After the joint accession of Slovakia and Hungary to the EU, 
regional cooperation across the border will be legitimate and will not stir 
apprehensions of irredentism. Another conciliatory factor is the emphasis put in 
Slovakia on language rather than on ethnicity and religion as a base for the Slovak 
ethnic nation and nationalism. The expected spread of bilingualism and biculturalism 
among the Hungarian minority will alleviate the fears and estrangement felt by ethnic 
Slovaks, promote mutual accommodation and produce some assimilation among 
them. 
Given these contradictory forces, the struggle over the character of Slovakia is far 
from over. The state has the potential of consolidating its ethnic democracy or 
becoming a multicultural democracy. 
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C. Estonia26 
Transition to democracy in some of the fifteen independent states that were 
formed as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union is still taking shape, but Estonia, 
Latvia, Georgia and the Moslem states in Asia Minor are clearly leaning toward the 
type of ethnic democracy. The national majorities took over these states and are 
transforming them to fit their culture, identity and interests, making it difficult for 
minorities to live there in equality and peace. Brubaker (1996) shows a direct link 
between these nationalizing policies and the institutionalization of nationhood and 
nationality as both a territorial-political entity (the 53 titular republics and 
autonomies) and as a personal, obligatory and ascribed status (over one hundred 
mutually exclusive nationalities) in the Soviet Union. 
 
Background 
For centuries Estonia was under successive occupiers (German, Danish, Swedish 
and Russians; the Russian occupation was the longest and most recent – 1710-1917) 
and became independent only in 1918. Estonia was a democracy until the mid-1930s 
and treated its Russian, German, Swedish and Jewish minorities (which made up 
12 per cent of the total population) quite well. In 1940 it was occupied and annexed 
by the Soviet Union, in 1941 it was seized by Nazi Germany and in late 1944 it was 
re-occupied by the Soviet Union. As a result of the 1944 Soviet takeover, about 
70,000 Estonians ran away and thousands of dissidents were repressed, deported, or 
disappeared. Estonia was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union as one of its 15 
titular republics. Sovietization meant nationalization of the economy, an authoritarian 
political system, and Russification. During the period from 1944 to 1953 about 50,000 
Estonians endured various forms of repression. 
The Soviets regarded the occupied frontier-republic of Estonia as a real danger to 
national security. To contain the hazard, they practiced a firm policy of deploying 
Russian-speaking soldiers and sending settlers there. They built new towns for the 
200,000 newcomers and granted them preferential treatment in housing, employment, 
administration and government. The proportion of Russian speakers rose dramatically 
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 For a systematic and thoughtful application of the full model of ethnic democracy to Estonia, 
see Järve 2000. This section also draws on the following sources: Stepan 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Shafir 1995; G. Smith 1996, 1999; Hallik 1996; Vetik 2000, 2001 in press; Semjonov 2001 in press;  
Pettai 2000; and Pettai and Hallik 2001. 
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from under 8 per cent before 1940 to over 35 per cent by independence in 1991. They 
evolved as a big, privileged and non-assimilating minority. Ethnic Estonians regarded 
them as agents of an occupying Empire and as simple colonizers. 
During the Singing Revolution, the Russian-speaking minorities were mostly 
opposed to independence. Among ethnic Estonians, two nationalist movements rose: 
the “inclusionary” Estonian Popular Front (1988) and the “exclusionary” Estonian 
Citizens Committees (1989). By independence in August 1991, the two movements 
agreed on the ideology of “legal restorationism” that was propagated by the Citizens 
Committees and was then adopted as a state ideology. According to this seemingly 
non-ethnic and legalistic doctrine, Estonia is not a former Soviet republic turning into 
a new state (as is the case, for instance, of the Ukraine) but rather a pre-existing, 
liberated state, restoring its pre-1940 independence. This doctrine was reluctantly 
accepted by the West because the allied superpowers had never recognized the Soviet 
takeover of the Baltics. 
The practical implication of the legal restorationism doctrine has been that 
automatic citizenship was extended only to residents who were citizens before 1940, 
turning Soviet-era immigrants into aliens. A new citizenship law (enacted in 1992, 
amended in 1995) and an alien law (enacted in 1993, consolidated in 2001) were 
legislated, requiring most Russian speakers to apply for a residence permit, a work 
permit and citizenship.  
Estonia’s population of 1,462,130 in 1997 was divided into 65 per cent ethnic 
Estonians, 32 per cent Russian-speakers (28 per cent Russians, 2.5 per cent 
Ukrainians and 1.5 Belarussians) and 3 per cent others. Of the 582,000 Russian 
speakers in 1989, 144,000 (25 per cent) received Estonian citizenship during the 
1990s, 100,000 (17 per cent) left the country (mostly during 1990-94), 88,000 (15 per 
cent) obtained Russian citizenship, and 250,000 (43 per cent) became stateless. By 
early 2000 Russian-speakers were divided into 30 per cent citizens, 18 per cent 
Russian citizens and 52 per cent stateless. With a quarter of its residents being non-
citizens, Estonia (like Latvia) has the highest non-citizen rate per capita in Europe. 
Estonia joined the OSCE and the United Nations in 1991 and the Council of 
Europe in 1993. It also applied for membership of the European Union and NATO. 
These and other international organizations have pressured Estonia to relax its strict 
requirements for citizenship and to integrate the Russian speakers. During the 1990s 
the state was busy consolidating the power of ethnic Estonians and putting the onus of 
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integration on the Russian speakers themselves. In March 2000 the government 
adopted a new integration program that aims to encourage and to partly fund the 
learning of the Estonian language, a step vital for the acquisition of Estonian 
citizenship. 
 
Ethnic Ascendancy 
Estonians constitute an ethnic nation, composed of ethnicity and distinct language. 
Ethnically they are descendants of a Finno-Ugric tribe in the third millennium BC 
which settled in the present area of Estonia. They claim continued residence in the 
country for the last 5,000 years. This Nordic stock group has a unique and difficult 
language, with affinity only to Finnish and Hungarian and without resemblance to any 
other European language. Although most Estonians today are nominally Lutherans, 
they are highly secular, and Christianity is divorced from their national identity. 
Estonia does not have a state religion and marriage and divorce are regulated by a 
civil law. The term “Estonian” is strictly ethnic and linguistic, neither religious nor 
civic. Citizenship is separated from nationality and the acquisition of citizenship does 
not grant membership in the Estonian nation. What would it take a non-Estonian to 
join the Estonian nation? One needs to command the Estonian language, to adopt the 
Estonian culture, and probably also to establish family or blood relations to ethnic 
Estonians. Acquisition of Estonian citizenship is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Ethnic Estonians see themselves as the exclusive owners of Estonia as both a 
homeland and a state. As a homeland, Estonia is where the Estonian ethnic nation 
fulfils its right to self-determination; as a state, Estonia is a tool for protecting the 
survival of the Estonian nation and for promoting the interests and wellbeing of ethnic 
Estonians. According to the preamble of the Constitution, the Republic of Estonia “is 
established on the inextinguishable right of the Estonian people to national self-
determination which was proclaimed on February 24, 1918,” and the state “shall 
guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages.” 
The Constitution also states that “The official language of Estonia shall be Estonian” 
and “The national colors of Estonia are blue, black and white.” In fact, the language, 
symbols, calendar, heroes and monuments of the state are strictly Estonian. 
Estonian ethnic ascendancy is particularly evident in the laws on language, 
citizenship, naturalization and immigration. The Estonian language is not just the 
single state language but is also endowed with an extraordinary status. The 
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constitution provides for the right of all citizens to have instruction in Estonian, to 
address local and state governments in Estonian, and to receive every service 
anywhere in the country in Estonian. Labeling of products, advertisements, public 
announcements, and communications at the workplace must be made in or also in 
Estonian. For instance, a Russian-speaking vendor in the Russian-speaking city of 
Narva is expected to serve customers in Estonian if they speak to him or her in 
Estonian. The express objectives of these legal provisions are that every ethnic 
Estonian should feel at home anywhere in Estonia and that a major obstacle to 
integration and even assimilation of non-Estonians into Estonians is removed. 
Knowledge of the Estonian language and Estonian citizenship are requirements for 
becoming a candidate for an elective office in the central and local governments. 
Estonian is also the official language of all local governments, although they are 
allowed to conduct their internal affairs in a minority language if the minority 
constitutes over 50 per cent of their residents. In the year 2007 the curriculum in non-
Estonian high schools must begin to change so that 60 per cent of it will finally be 
taught in Estonian. 
The citizenship law clearly aims to maximize the number of ethnic Estonians and 
to minimize the share of others. Drawing on the ideology of legal restorationism, 
citizenship is accorded to persons who were citizens before 1940 and to their 
descendants. Since the overwhelming majority of Russian-speakers arrived after 
1940, the law is obviously designed to exclude them. These former Soviet citizens all 
of a sudden became aliens and had to apply for residence and work permits. As a 
result 70 per cent of Russian-speakers are not citizens of Estonia. 
The Estonian naturalization law is quite restrictive. For Russian-speakers who are 
already in the country, it requires a legal residence for five years, passing of a 
comprehensive test in the Estonian language and a test on the Estonian Constitution, a 
legal income, pledge of allegiance to the country and to the Constitution, and 
renunciation of any foreign citizenship. Most of these strict requirements are waived 
for children born in Estonia to stateless parents since 1992 in order to comply with the 
International Convention on Children Rights. 
Settlement in Estonia is practically administered through two separate tracks: 
return and immigration. The constitutional provision that “every [ethnic] Estonian 
shall have the right to settle in Estonia” is equivalent to right of return. Estonia has a 
Diaspora of 100,000, living mostly in North America and Scandinavia. Since they 
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originate from pre-1940 Estonian citizens, they qualify for return to Estonia and for 
automatic citizenship. In fact, only a few returned because of the advantages of living 
in the West. Estonia has a commitment to preserve the Estonian identity of Diaspora 
Estonians and to strengthen their ties to their original homeland. It helps them with 
language instruction and cultural activities. In a complementary fashion, immigration 
to Estonia is practically denied to non-Estonians. 
Estonians actually own and control the lands in Estonia. Privatization meant 
restoring lands to their previous owners who were ethnic Estonians before the Soviet 
takeover. Land ownership of Russian-speakers is restricted to residential dwellings 
only, even in areas where they constitute a majority. 
 
Perceived Threats 
Estonia and ethnic Estonians are preoccupied with two large-scale threats. The 
immediate and clear danger is posed to the territorial and political integrity of the 
state. Soviet occupation and oppression are still fresh memories. Russia avoids 
signing a border treaty with Estonia although there is no longer any territorial issue.27 
It is a superpower whose political regime is short of stable democracy and its 
economy is in continued crisis. It is feared that instability and rise of nationalist-
reactionary political forces in Russia might trigger intervention in the small and 
fragile neighboring state whose territory used to be part of Tsarist Russia and the 
Soviet empire. Estonia tries to protect itself by joining NATO and the EU and by 
acting as part of the Baltic Rim. 
The security threat to Estonia is exacerbated by the nature of its main minority. 
The northeast region and areas bordering with Russia are mostly populated by 
Russian-speakers, of whom most are aliens, with firm linguistic and cultural 
attachment to Russia and unclear loyalty to Estonia. Both Russia and Russian-
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 According to the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 Soviet Russia agreed to a loss of areas which 
increased Estonian territory by 5 per cent. These areas were ceded back to the Russian republic during 
the Soviet era (1940-91). After renewing its sovereignty, Estonia claimed the 1920 borders to be its 
official boundaries according to the restorationist principle and formalized this claim in article 122 of 
its Constitution. This claim proved to be unrealistic because Russia would not give up territory which 
was Russian before 1920 and populated by Russians at present. It is also not in Estonian interest to 
boost its Russian-speaking population by regaining Russian territory. For this reason and also because 
Estonia must have recognized permanent borders in order to join the EU, it dropped this demand in 
1995 and since then it has been ready to sign a border treaty with Russia. But Russia is not signing the 
treaty in order to pressure Estonia to improve its treatment of the Russian-speaking minority. Estonia 
is, however, told by the EU that the Russian failure to sign the agreed-upon border treaty will not be a 
reason for not acceding the EU. 
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speakers see Russia as the ethnic patron of Russian-speakers and the fact that 88,000 
residents in Estonia are Russian citizens gives Russia extra and ostensibly legitimate 
grounds for intrusion. 
The other big threat is directed to the very survival of Estonians as an ethnic 
nation. The Estonians are a very small people numbering only 1,050,000 million 
(950,000 in Estonia and 100,000 abroad). Their language is unique, hard to learn and 
useless outside Estonia. They may lose people through emigration to the West, 
cultural attrition and assimilation. The ethnic Estonian elite and public feel strongly 
that only by building an Estonian nation-state which promotes the language, culture, 
demography, interests and welfare of ethnic Estonians, this menace to national 
survival can be checked. It is widely believed that to be attractive and viable, Estonia 
must be part of the West and offer Estonians western standards and lifestyles. 
The need for an ethnic nation-state is vital also because of the ethnic composition 
of Estonia. In the eyes of ethnic Estonians, who make up a declining majority of less 
than two-thirds, Russian speakers, with a share of one-third of the population, 
constitute a too big, non-assimilating, dissident, potentially disloyal and formidable 
minority. To radically change the minority’s threatening character, the state uses 
disenfranchisement and naturalization as a machinery of control. Denial of citizenship 
puts Russian-speakers in a state of basic insecurity, powerlessness and disorientation. 
It also neutralizes them as an effective political force for transforming the country into 
a bilingual, bicultural and binational state. The long process and the various 
stipulations to acquire citizenship are meant to be a critical rite of passage to loyalty 
to the country and to the state’s ethnic regime as well as to preparedness for 
integration and assimilation. A series of governmental integration programs intend to 
facilitate integration and assimilation of the Russian-speaking community, to appease 
it and to send a goodwill message to the monitoring international bodies while 
keeping intact the structures of ethnic ascendancy.28 
 
Quasi-Democracy 
The complexity of the situation in Estonia raises a big question regarding the 
classification of the regime. There is no doubt that Estonia is a democracy for the 
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 Semjonov (2000) argues that equality of rights should precede true integration, and not the other 
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majority. It maintains separation of powers, fair and free elections, change of 
governments, independent judiciary, free press, and the like. The Estonian democracy 
relies on the democratic tradition of the 1920s and part of the 1930s. Democracy is 
also supported by the Estonian elite and general public. They understand that to 
secure Estonia’s survival and progress, it is required to join the West, and a stable 
democracy is a precondition. The Western world considers Estonia as a well-
functioning democracy to the extent that it was upgraded to the select category of 
countries entitled to the first round of accession to the EU, while the less democratic 
Slovakia was downgraded to the second round. The EU, OSCE and the Council of 
Europe advise and pressure Estonia to ease its criteria of naturalization and to assist 
non-citizens in meeting them in order to reduce the size of the alien population. 
The scientific and normative question remains, however, if Estonia should be 
treated as a Herrenvolk democracy, an ethnic democracy, or rather a civic democracy. 
According to Linz and Stepan (1996), Estonia and Latvia do not qualify as 
democracies (or they qualify as Herrenvolk democracies) as long as they keep 
denying the vote to most members of the non-Baltic, Russian-speaking minorities.29 
This assessment is based on the fact that the Russian-speaking minorities were 
citizens before 1991, at the time of their arrival they were bona fide migrants from 
one part of the Soviet homeland to another, and since 1991 they have demanded full 
citizenship and seen their lives and future tied to the Baltic states. 
This view is rejected by most writers on Estonia. Estonian scholars either avoid 
the issue altogether, accept the “normalcy” and fairness of the Constitution and state 
policies, point to Estonia’s turbulent and unique history as a justification, or stress the 
liberalization policies over time. Vetik (2000) presents Estonia, as reshaped by the 
2000 state program of integration in Estonian society (Government of Estonia 2000), 
as an evolving multicultural democracy. Taagepera (1994), an Estonian-American 
political scientist who ran as a candidate to the state presidency, finds fundamental 
similarities between Estonia and Israel and regards both as ethnic democracies. Other 
western scholars are similarly lenient in their judgment. G. Smith (1996) classifies 
Estonia as an ethnic democracy and advances a general thesis that denial or strict 
regulation of citizenship is a characteristic on which ethnic democracies vary. 
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 Linz and Stepan use the term “ethnic democracy” as a synonym of “Herrenvolk democracy.” 
They condition the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Estonia and Latvia on the 
enfranchisement of the Russian-speaking minorities. 
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Kymlicka (2000) regards Estonia as a democracy, stressing the peculiar status of 
Russian-speakers, stemming from being at once partly transients, partly immigrants 
and partly natives. The view that Estonia is some kind of democracy is supported by 
the fact that the years from 1940 to 1991 were a period of illegal Soviet occupation 
that brought over resident aliens; Russian-speakers were citizens of the defunct Soviet 
Union, not of Estonia, and hence cannot make claims to Estonia; throughout the time 
of their settlement they were regarded by locals as intruders, colonists and transients, 
and they did not make any effort to mix, integrate or assimilate; and naturalization is 
in principle possible, though under restrictive conditions. 
In this controversy on the classification of Estonia, I tend to regard Estonia as a 
nation-state that is slowly developing into an ethnic democracy. Estonia does not 
exhibit the essential feature of ethnic democracy, viz., that permanent residents are 
enfranchised and able to avail themselves of democratic procedures in their fight for 
change. Estonia denies automatic citizenship to Russian-speakers despite the fact that 
they are and see themselves as a permanent part of the state and demand automatic 
citizenship. In contrast, Israel is an ethnic democracy because the Arab minority is 
extended citizenship and the non-citizen Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are 
not and do not want to be part of Israel. Järve (2000) rightly claims that Estonia can 
already be seen as an ethnic democracy for the one-tenth of its Russian-speaking 
population who are citizens. As the proportion of non-citizens (close to one-quarter of 
the total population in 2000) steadily diminishes, Estonia will increasingly qualify as 
an ethnic democracy. 
Estonia is not a diminished ethnic democracy because the Russian-speakers are 
deprived of the basic means of conducting democratic struggle. Most of them, being 
non-citizens, are not allowed to form or join political parties, to vote to the 
parliament, to be elected to public office, and to be employed in the civil service. 
Their deficient knowledge of the Estonian language limits their access to middle- and 
high-ranking jobs in the labor market which functions in Estonian. They cannot take 
advantage of Estonia’s liberal law on cultural autonomy and other laws and 
conventions on the protection of minority rights because these legal or international 
provisions apply to citizens only. They are completely excluded from the national 
power structure. Their disorganization and helplessness are considerable to the extent 
that even their representation in the city council of Tallinn, where they number half of 
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the residents, is meager, although permanent residents (stateless persons and foreign 
nationals) may vote (but may not run for office) in local elections. 
 
Factors Conducive to Emergence 
Although the factors conducive to the emergence of an ethnic democracy in 
Estonia prevailed during 1989-90 and although at that time there was a struggle 
among ethnic Estonians on the type of regime to be established, the final outcome was 
a quasi-democracy. The configuration of conditions in favor of ethnic democracy in 
Estonia consisted of a public and elite commitment to democracy, a strong sense of an 
Estonian ethnic nation under a threat of survival, and a deep-seated fear and rejection 
of Russian-speakers. However, the essential demographic condition was missing. 
Russian-speakers were a prohibitively big and unmanageable minority. Had they been 
automatically enfranchised, they could certainly have used their power to stop the 
project of building an Estonian ethnic nation-state or at least to de-stabilize the 
country.30 
 
Conditions of Stability 
The Russian-speaking community has so far not reacted to Estonia’s hardline 
policies with a mass exodus and unrest. It has shown remarkable impotence and 
accommodation. This is mostly due to the debilitating control through 
disenfranchisement and its legitimization by the ideology of “legal restorationism” 
that the West accepts in principle. But there are many other contributory factors to the 
acquiescence of the Russian-speaking minority, including the active western backing 
of Estonia, Russia’s non-intervention, the prospects of naturalization under certain 
conditions, the Russian-speakers’ belief in a better future for their children who will 
surely become citizens of both Estonia and the EU, the better economic opportunities 
in Estonia as compared to Russia, the great difficulties of resettlement in Russia and 
the lack of option to immigrate to the West. 
The current political system is, nevertheless, transitional and the question is what 
is the likely trajectory. Estonia will become an ethnic democracy if ethnic Estonians 
                                                 
30
 The impact of the demographic factor is evident in the other two Baltic states. The demographic 
ratio is much more skewed in Latvia than in Estonia, where ethnic Latvians constituted only 52.0 per 
cent of the total population in 1989. Latvia also chose the road of disenfranchisement of post-1940 
immigrants-settlers. On the other hand, Lithuania extended citizenship for all because ethnic 
Lithuanians make up 84 per cent of the population. 
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will increase their majority appreciably by the emigration or assimilation of part of 
the Russian-speakers. In addition, for an ethnic democracy to be stable, ethnic 
Estonians should continue to feel strongly that an ethnic nation-state is necessary for 
the invaluable survival of the Estonian ethnic nation and for the containment of the 
threats emanating from a Russian-speaking minority that is non-assimilating, dissident 
and backed by Russia. 
Ethnic democracy may be, however, deemed undesirable or redundant if the 
shrinking Russian-speaking minority will prove to be loyal, trustworthy, 
accommodating, detached from Russia, assimilating and absolutely needed in a very 
small state like Estonia that is suffering from a growing demographic deficit. This 
scenario will encourage a shift toward a civic type of democracy. 
 
D. Northern Ireland (1921-72)31 
Ulster was an ethnic democracy during its statutory autonomy from 1921 to 1972. 
The Protestant majority perceived Ulster as its patrimony and instituted its dominance 
over it. The Protestants excluded the Catholics from the national power structure, 
exercised institutional discrimination against them, defined them as a potentially 
disloyal minority and imposed control over them. At the same time, Ulster was a 
democracy for all and the Catholics were represented in the parliament, maintained a 
viable civil society (control of their schools, churches and a network of organizations) 
and retained firm ties with Ireland. 
The system collapsed in 1972 when the British government suspended autonomy 
and ruled Northern Ireland directly. This change occurred as a result of Protestant 
intransigence on the one hand, and the large and unmanageable size and substantial 
political strength of the Catholic minority on the other. After many abortive attempts, 
the British slowly moved to institute consociational democracy and to involve Ireland 
in Ulster’s internal affairs. The new system was agreed upon and started to operate in 
1999. 
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 For the application of the ethnic democracy model to Northern Ireland, see Smooha 1997b and 
2001. Other useful sources include Wilson 1989; Whyte 1990; O’Leary and McGarry 1993, 1995; and 
McGarry 1998 and 2001. 
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E. Poland (1918-35)32 
When Poland became independent in 1918, after a century and a half of division 
and subjugation, it initiated a large-scale project of nationalization of the state, 
namely, establishing the ethnic Poles as a core ethnic nation and turning Poland into 
an ethnic democracy. The country was identified as the state of and for ethnic Poles 
and a policy of exclusion was practiced against the non-core minorities which 
constituted 30 per cent of the population at the time. Polanization proceeded 
vigorously in language, education, media and representation in the economy and in 
regions where ethnic Poles were exceedingly underrepresented. The middle-class 
German minority (4 per cent) in the West, seen as disloyal, was mostly driven out. 
The assimilation policy toward the Slavs (18 per cent) in the East failed because it 
was imposed with discrimination and without incentives. Considered unworthy of 
assimilation, the widely dispersed Jews (8 per cent) were neutralized by the anti-
Semitic state, encouraged to leave and partly dispossessed. 
After 1935 Poland lost its democracy, shifting from an ethnic democracy to a non-
democratic ethnic state. Despite its strong ethnic ties, post-communist Poland can 
afford liberal democracy because during and in the aftermath of World War Two it 
got rid of all its national minorities. 
 
F. Malaysia33 
Since the early 1970s Malaysia has become an ethnic democracy, although a weak 
and restricted democracy. From independence in 1957 through 1969, it was 
considered a successful consociational democracy. The Malay majority held political 
power and the Chinese and Indian minorities kept economic power. The coalition 
government included all the major ethnic groups, group autonomy was respected and 
politics of compromise prevailed. 
The system was reconstituted in the 1970s as an ethnic democracy. Since the shift 
in regime, the state has been identified with the Malay majority. It institutionalizes 
Malay dominance, Islam as a state religion and Malay as a state language. 
Immigration policy is designed to preserve a Malay majority. State preferential 
treatment of Malays in admission to the universities and state civil service and in 
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certain economic ventures is instituted as a common policy. Restrictions are imposed 
on land acquisitions by non-Malays. At the same time, the Chinese and Indian 
minorities continue to maintain cultural autonomy and to participate in coalition 
governments. 
 
10. Some Implications 
The model of ethnic democracy has further implications for the political 
integration and ethnonational peace of a society. 
1. Ethnic democracy is an effective integrative, assimilative and mobilizing tool 
for members of the core ethnic nation. It is a highly inclusionary instrument, instilling 
a strong ethnic-national identity and reinforcing a keen sense of a common destiny. 
This is well shown in Israel in the rapid amalgamation of Jews hailing from over one 
hundred countries. The state has successfully induced the population to accept 
millions of immigrants and has mobilized both oldtimers and newcomers for the 
reconstruction of society and for the great war effort. 
2. Ethnic democracy is an inegalitarian, exclusionary, disintegrative, segregative 
and alienating force for non-core groups. This is true for the minorities in all the 
countries discussed above: Arabs in Israel, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russian-speakers 
in Estonia, Catholics in Northern Ireland, non-Poles in inter-war Poland, and Chinese 
and Indians in Malaysia. Assimilation, as measured in rates of intermarriage, loss of 
original language and adoption of local identity, is much lower in ethnic democracies 
than in liberal democracies (see for example the high assimilation of all minorities, 
excluding the special case of African-Americans, in the United States). 
3. Ethnic democracy itself is a key controversial issue dividing majority and 
minority. While liberal, multicultural and consociational democracies do not become 
internal divisive issues, ethnic democracy does. Legitimacy of the regime is deficient 
in the eyes of the minorities who regard it as a means of discrimination against them. 
Objection to ethnic democracy is prevalent among the minorities in all the reviewed 
cases. Aware of the inherent problem of illegitimacy, the state tries to get the 
compliance of the minorities but not their identification with the system. 
4. If given a choice, non-assimilating minorities would prefer consociational 
democracy most, then multicultural democracy, then ethnic democracy, while liberal 
democracy is the least preferred. Since consociational and multicultural democracy 
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provide both separation and equality, they are the best options. On the other hand, the 
assimilative pressures of liberal democracy threaten non-assimilating minorities, and 
hence it is the worst choice. The intermediary position of ethnic democracy stems 
from its provision of separation along with considerable opportunities and rights. 
Indeed, surveys in Israel show that the Arabs’ first choice is consociational or 
multicultural democracy, but they prefer improved ethnic democracy to liberal 
democracy. 
5. Non-core groups conduct continuous struggle that results in incremental and 
inconsistent change. Minorities wage a struggle for equality and against the 
restrictions imposed on them. Since they lack the power to bring about radical change, 
the system changes only incrementally. The democratic game results in gains and 
losses and in inconsistent and patchwork situations. Consequently the status of 
minorities is complex and unbalanced. For instance, Catholics in Northern Ireland 
were discriminated against but they enjoyed autonomy. The Chinese in Malaysia 
maintain a strong socioeconomic position and participation in government despite the 
preferential treatment of Malays in all spheres of life. Arab struggle in Israel caused 
an end to the expropriation of lands to which they possess titles. 
6. Ethnic democracy may become less functional over time and may diminish and 
even change to another type of democracy. It is quite likely that Slovakia may become 
a multicultural democracy. On the other hand, there are slim chances that Israel will 
become a civic democracy because the project of the ingathering of the exiles is far 
from being complete (most Jews still live in the Diaspora) and the Jewish state will 
continue to live in an insecure environment for a long time to come. 
 
11. Conclusions 
Various forces are impinging on the relatively homogenous, liberal-democratic 
nation-state in the West. They include globalization, regional integration and 
agreements on universal minority rights on the one hand, and defiance of assimilation 
by national minorities, indigenous peoples and immigrants, on the other. The western 
nation-state is shifting toward “multicultural democracy,” a newly forming regime 
that can better accommodate these pressures and minority claims. 
While western countries are decoupling the nation-state and are becoming more 
multicultural in ideology and practice, there are other states that are engaged, rather, 
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in designing and crystallizing a nation-state on the basis of two conflicting organizing 
principles: democracy for all and ethnonational ascendancy of the majority group. 
These states are driven by a strong impulse of ethnonationalism that seeks satisfaction 
in an ethnic nation-state and by a sense of threat posed by ethnocultural, 
ethnonational, non-assimilating and dissident groups living in the country. Some of 
the new-old states in Central-Eastern Europe are prime examples, but as the process 
of democratization gathers momentum more divided societies will develop along 
these lines. 
The construction of ethnic democracy as a distinct analytical type is necessary for 
accounting for these cases that are not properly classifiable by the existing models of 
liberal, consociational and Herrenvolk democracy, and by the addition of a new type 
of multicultural democracy. Ethnic democracy is based on an inherent contradiction 
between extension of rights and freedoms for all and institutionalized ethnic 
dominance and exclusion. The model of ethnic democracy consists of features, factors 
conducive for emergence and conditions of stability. It is an elaborated model that 
contributes to the descriptive, analytical and theoretical tools for the comparative 
study of political systems in divided societies. In addition to offering a description, 
the model helps in generalizing about the dynamics of the regime – circumstances 
leading to the rise, consolidation, shift, or disintegration of ethnic democracy. 
The incorporation of non-democratic elements into the model of ethnic democracy 
has become a major reason for criticism and even rejection of the model by some 
scholars. Ethnic democracy is criticized for being illegitimate (a non-democracy 
posing as a democracy), unstable (a political system built on inherent contradictions 
cannot be stable) and inefficient (conflicts are left simmering). 
Israel within its pre-1967 borders serves as an archetype, a springboard and a 
benchmark for the initial formulation and further development of the model of ethnic 
democracy. A detailed analysis of Israel shows that it is a viable and stable 
democracy, but fitting none of the existing, civic, western types of democracy. It is 
better understood as a case of ethnic democracy. The state is constituted as the 
homeland of the Jewish core ethnic nation, with a large Diaspora, and its institutions, 
policies and symbols are streamlined to cater to the Jewish majority, not to its 
citizens. Seen by the Jews as a numerically and electorally significant, ideologically 
dissident and potentially disloyal minority, Israeli Arabs are, nevertheless, accorded 
civil and political rights as well as all the necessary arrangements to preserve their 
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separate existence and identity. Arab citizens have undergone a process of 
Israelization without assimilation and gradual adaptation to the Jewish and democratic 
state. The democratization of the state and the continued militant Israeli Arab 
struggle, among other factors, have forced ethnic democracy to liberalize over the 
years. Fifty-three years of Arab-Jewish coexistence have shown that ethnic 
democracy can be a flexible, adaptable and sustainable system in keeping political 
stability in a divided society. Ethnic democracy in Israel will be further reformed if 
and when the Jewish majority concedes to the Arab minority a policy of non-
discrimination, cultural autonomy, inclusion into coalition politics and into the 
national power structure, and state recognition of the Arabs as a Palestinian national 
minority. Such reforms can be made without abandoning ethnic democracy. 
Ethnic democracy is especially attractive to ethnic states that are democratizing. 
The transition from a non-democracy to a liberal, multicultural or consociational 
democracy is too big a jump to make for some of these ethnic states, discovering 
ethnic democracy as a compromise that allows them to retain ethnic dominance and 
ethnic nationalism along with democracy. Some of the independent states of the 
former Soviet Union, especially Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and the Moslem states, are 
moving in this direction. 
Slovakia is another case in point. After gaining independence in 1993, ethnic 
Slovaks have for the first time a state of their own in which they can fully fulfill their 
right to self-determination after centuries of being ruled by the Hungarians and partly 
dominated by the Czech. The new state declares itself to be the state of the Slovak 
ethnic nation, not its citizens, and is building Slovakia as a uninational, unilingual and 
unicultural state. It perceives the Hungarian minority as a major national threat. The 
Hungarians are a non-assimilating minority, concentrated on the southern border with 
Hungary in areas ceded from Hungary, officially attached to and supported by 
Hungary, highly mobilized and demanding autonomy and other national rights. 
Estonia is another pertinent case. After it regained its independence in 1991, 
Estonia proclaimed itself the state of the Estonian ethnic nation, imposed Estonian as 
the sole official language, singled out the big Russian-speaking minority as a national 
threat and, most importantly, adopted laws and policies that deny most of the Russian-
speakers political citizenship and restrict their rights in many areas of life. Estonia 
qualifies as an ethnic democracy only for one-tenth of its minority population that is 
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enfranchised but as long as the remaining one-quarter continues to be disenfranchised 
it is only a quasi-democracy. 
The application of the model of ethnic democracy to Israel, Slovakia and Estonia 
demonstrates that ethnic democracies are distinct from both civic democracies and 
non-democracies. These three countries have in common deep divided societies 
(significant, dissenting, non-assimilating national minorities with affiliation to 
external homelands), strong orientation to the West, mixed economies and democratic 
structures. They are all engaged in nation- and state-building. They see themselves 
and are seen by the West as democracies. Yet, all of them assert themselves as 
homelands of ethnic majorities, aiming to promote the demography, language, culture, 
identity and interests of their majorities, rather than their citizenries. The ethnic rule 
for organizing state and society conflicts with the democratic rule, resulting in 
considerable tensions and numerous dilemmas. 
Ethnic democracy is also found in other ethnically split countries. A relatively 
stable ethnic democracy prevails in Malaysia. On the other hand, ethnic democracy 
broke down in Northern Ireland in 1972 and in Poland during the inter-war period. 
Turkey with its outright rejection of the large Kurdish population as a national 
minority is a clear candidate for ethnic democracy provided it consolidates its 
democracy. Québec and the Palestinian Authority, if and when they achieve 
sovereignty, may strongly lean toward ethnic democracy because of their ethnic 
nationalism and long-term national frustration. 
The ethnic democracy model is non-western in essence, but it is to a certain 
degree also relevant to Germany. In Germany a clearcut distinction is made between a 
German core ethnic nation and non-core groups. Germany lacks an immigration law 
despite the existence of millions of immigrants and practices a policy of restricting 
citizenship to ethnic Germans (it absorbed about 15 million of them since 1945 as 
“returnees,” not immigrants) as much as possible (Fulbrook 1996; Halfmann 1997; 
Joppke 1996). 
Non-western and democratic Japan is similar to Germany in many ethnic respects. 
In order to keep its ethnic purity, it virtually disallows immigration and naturalization 
of non-ethnic Japanese. Instead of importing cheap labor, it exports production. The 
relevance of the Japanese preoccupation with racial, ethnic and cultural purity can be 
elucidated by the ethnic democracy model. 
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The ideology and politics of the radical right in western countries, especially in 
France, are manifestations that can be illuminated by the model of ethnic democracy. 
The cultural and ethnic diversity introduced by the immigration of non-western 
peoples to the West brings to the open layers of intolerance, hidden and dormant in 
these societies. The radical right plays on popular discontent and anxiety, advocating 
solutions tantamount to the transformation of the system from a civic democracy to an 
ethnic democracy. The attraction of the radical right reflects the tenacity of ethnicity 
and the continued appeal of ethnic democracy to certain strata in liberal democracies. 
Ethnic democracy is a descriptive and analytical, not a normative model. 
Although it may enjoy international legitimacy, as in the case of Israel, it can serve 
both supporters and critics. A familiarity with all the types of democracy would help 
the advocates and opponents of any given system of democracy to clarify their 
positions and to sort out their differences. On the other hand, multicultural democracy 
is both a descriptive and analytical type and a normative model endorsed by the rising 
ideology of multiculturalism. 
The new wave of democratization in the world today makes ethnic democracy a 
promising theoretical model. It is a particularly pertinent trajectory for some 
democratizing ethnic states that would prefer this avenue, instead of liberal, 
multicultural or consociational democracy, because it does not require the 
renouncement of ethnic ascendancy by the dominant majorities. 
The model of ethnic democracy is awaiting a comparative study of ethnic 
democracies for further theoretical formulation and empirical enrichment. 
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